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All the Better To Eat You With, My Dear:
The Need for a Heightened Harm Standard in Utah’s
Grandparent Visitation Statute
I. INTRODUCTION
In the classic children’s folktale “Little Red Riding Hood,”1 a
young girl was deceived by a wolf posing as her grandmother. The
child willingly approached the disguised wolf—who ultimately ate
her—because she believed the wolf was her grandmother, someone
she trusted would never harm her.2 The early proliferation and
popularity of grandparent visitation statutes was premised on a
similar assumption: court-ordered grandparent visitation would
never harm grandchildren.3 Experience has shown, however, that
court-ordered grandparent visitation against the parent’s wishes may
be like a wolf in disguise because such visitation is sometimes the
product of petitions by grandparents willing to act in ways that harm
their grandchildren and because court-ordered visitation may be
ultimately harmful even to children ordered to visit with otherwise
benevolent grandparents.4
1. See Andrew Lang, Little Red Riding Hood, in THE BLUE FAIRY BOOK 51, 51
(Andrew Lang ed., Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1965) (1889).
2. Id.
3. See Joan Catherine Bohl, Grandparent Visitation Law Grows Up: The Trend Toward
Awarding Visitation Only when the Child Would Otherwise Suffer Harm, 48 DRAKE L. REV.
279, 281 (2000).
4. Laurence C. Nolan, Beyond Troxel: The Pragmatic Challenges of Grandparent
Visitation Continue, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 267, 269 (2002). For example, court-ordered
grandparent visitation always “disrupts the normal routine of parents and their children,” and
this disruption can range from minor to substantial, even perhaps involving cross-country
airline travel or missed school and extra-curricular activities. Id. at 281. Overnight visitation
and frequent changes in daily routines and discipline styles are particularly problematic for
young children. Id. at 283. For parents who must work throughout the week, weekend
grandparent visitation interferes with the only significant uninterrupted time available for the
parent-child relationship. Id. at 282. This is especially true for working custodial parents whose
children have weekend visitation orders with the noncustodial parent as well as with
grandparents. In fact, grandparent visitation may be a tool used by the noncustodial parent to
obtain more visitation. Id. Grandparents may expose children to people and/or activities that a
parent believes will be harmful to the children. See id. at 280. Even if such exposures are not
inherently harmful, the parent loses the ability to decide with whom the children should
associate and what activities are in the children’s best interest. Ultimately, the parent must deal
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In Utah, there is no common law right of grandparent visitation;
however, the Utah legislature has authorized statutory grandparent
visitation since 1975.5 Utah’s current Grandparent Visitation
Statute6 represents a clash between parents, who have a traditionally
protected autonomy to make decisions regarding the care, custody,
and control of their children, and grandparents, who by political fiat
may now enlist the power of the state to override parental autonomy
and obtain and enforce court-ordered visitation rights with their
grandchildren.7 In the resultant controversy, both parties defend
their positions with the ostensible motive of protecting the best
interests of the children involved. There is no doubt that out-ofwith the consequences of these exposures. Scheduling issues, rescheduling missed visits, and
parental input about what occurs during grandparent visits are especially difficult to address
between parents and grandparents already so hostile to each other that they are in court
fighting over the children. Id. at 273. Children are inevitably exposed to these conflicts
between parents and grandparents, notwithstanding court orders that adults keep these
disputes to themselves. Id. at 284. Children may be harmed by the loss of household income
that a parent must expend to defend against the grandparents’ visitation lawsuit; this expense
may be so burdensome that many parents may not be able to mount a defense. Id. at 272.
Finally, children may be harmed by the sanctions courts can impose on their parents while
enforcing grandparent visitation, such as make-up visitation, additional parental time and
household income expended on court-ordered counseling or mediation, attorney’s fees, fines
or payment of the grandparents’ attorney’s fees, or even incarceration. Id. at 277; see also
Stephen A. Newman, Grandparent Visitation Claims: Assessing the Multiple Harms of
Litigation to Families and Children, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 21, 23 (2003) (pointing out that
courts, in almost all cases, hear grandparent visitation disputes involving families whose
relationships are fundamentally broken, appraising the “negative consequences of
intergenerational litigation and the harms caused by state-coerced grandparent visitation in the
context of the malfunctioning extended family,” and arguing that a very high degree of
deference be given to the parent’s visitation decision to prevent harm to children); Theresa H.
Sykora, Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Are the Best Interests of the Grandparent Being Met
Before Those of the Child?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 753, 761 (1996) (describing studies that analyze
various forms of grandparent-grandchild interactions, arguing that courts often fail to
appropriately analyze the child’s best interest in light of the harms visitation orders may cause,
and concluding that a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions for their children must
include even the right to be temporarily wrong about a visitation decision).
5. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953) (amended 1975); see also Family Court Act,
ch. 72, 1969 Utah Laws 327.
6. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(1)–(2) (Supp. 2005).
7. See Joan C. Bohl, The “Unprecedented Intrusion”: A Survey and Analysis of Selected
Grandparent Visitation Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 31 (noting the “impressive political cloud
wielded by a graying America” that has resulted in broad grandparent visitation statutes
enforceable through “the awesome power of the state”); Michael K. Goldberg, Over the River
and Through the Woods—Again: The New Illinois Grandparent Visitation Act, 29 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 403, 409 (2005) (quoting one U.S. representative as saying that “[i]t is a well known fact
that seniors are the most active lobby in this country, and when it comes to grandparents there
is no one group more united in their purpose”).
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wedlock births, increased divorce rates, and other factors are
changing the family structures in which children are raised. This may
result in children having, for at least some period of time, meaningful
parent-like interactions with extended family members upon which
the children come to rely.8 Depending on the circumstances, these
relationships may be deserving of court protection. But in other
cases, the controversy represents an unwarranted attempt by
grandparents to forcibly infringe upon a parent’s fundamental right
and obligation to direct a child’s upbringing, or it represents an
intrusion into a purely intra-familial dispute in which courts have
historically declined to intervene.9 Because legitimate claims to
safeguard children exist alongside spurious demands, a state is at
times justified in the exercise of its parens patriae10 power to override
grandparent visitation decisions made by parents. However, concerns
over the constitutionality of Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute,
both facially and as applied, are also justified because great harm to
children and parents may result from abuse of state power where the
state’s parens patriae interest is not implicated.
Since its inception, Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute has
undergone numerous revisions and amendments.11 Although two of
the Statute’s amendments12 were direct attempts to comply with
state and federal constitutional mandates,13 ongoing constitutional
controversy has plagued the Statute.14 This is partly due to the
8. See Lawrence Schlam, Standing in Third-Party Custody Disputes in Arizona: Best
Interests to Parental Rights—And Shifting the Balance Back Again, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 719, 720
(2005).
9. See Laurence C. Nolan, Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother: But Court-Ordered
Grandparent Visitation in the Intact Family?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 51, 53 & n.10 (1993).
10. Literally means “parent of his or her country”; a doctrine authorizing state
intervention on behalf of those unable to protect themselves. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144
(8th ed. 2004).
11. See Pilot Program Repeal Clean-Up, ch. 129, 2005 Utah Laws 1215; Visitation
Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298; Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch.
265, 2000 Utah Laws 1107; Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361;
Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 257, 1995 Utah Laws 834; Visitation Rights of
Grandparents and Other Immediate Family Members, ch. 152, § 2, 1993 Utah Laws 593;
Grandparents’ Rights Extended, ch. 175, 1992 Utah Laws 676; Grandparents’ Visitation
Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566.
12. See Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298; Grandparents
Visitation Rights, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361.
13. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d
635, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
14. See Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083.
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United States Supreme Court’s splintered opinion in Troxel v.
Granville,15 which left substantial leeway to state legislatures to draft
grandparent visitation statutes within its constitutional confines. The
controversy is also partly due to ongoing social transformation about
the definition of “family” and the resulting legislative and judicial
uncertainty regarding the amount of protection that should be
afforded to meaningful, non-parental relationships with children.
The recent Utah Supreme Court decision Uzelac v. Thurgood (In
re Estate of S.T.T.)16 affirmed the constitutionality of Utah’s current
Grandparent Visitation Statute because the Statute complied with
the due process requirements mandated in Troxel v. Granville.17
Simultaneously, the decision acknowledged that the current statute,
although constitutional, is flawed, confusing, and difficult for courts
to apply.18 The Utah Supreme Court called for greater legislative
clarity regarding the multiple factors courts must consider before
making an award of grandparent visitation.19 Specifically, the court
encouraged the Utah legislature to issue guidelines on the weight to
be given to each of the Statute’s several factors and attempted to aid
the legislature by grouping these factors into three categories.20
However, the court’s suggestions for revising the Statute, as well as
its as-applied analysis in Thurgood, failed to address important factual
and policy considerations that the legislature should explore prior to
amending the Statute.
This Comment argues that Utah’s Grandparent Visitation
Statute should be amended to require grandparents to show, as a
threshold consideration, that a parent is unfit to make a visitation
decision that is in the children’s best interest. Alternatively,
grandparents should be required to show that the children’s health,
safety, and welfare would be harmed more without a visitation order
than with a visitation order. If grandparents can make this showing,
the court should then examine whether the amount and type of
visitation preferred by the parent is reasonably suited to prevent the
harm that would be caused without a visitation order. If it is, the
15. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Troxel v. Granville is the Supreme Court’s only grandparent
visitation case to date.
16. 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083.
17. Id. ¶¶ 26–36.
18. Id. ¶ 36.
19. Id.
20. Id. ¶¶ 26–35.

1672

SCHOFIELD.MRO.COM

1669]

1/23/2007 2:16:44 PM

Interpreting Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute

court should defer to the parent. Requiring grandparents to make a
heightened showing that a visitation order would prevent harm to
the child is the most appropriate way to balance the competing needs
and claims of children, parents, and grandparents.
In support of these propositions, Part II of this Comment
considers the enactment and early history of Utah’s Grandparent
Visitation Statute.21 Part III discusses the first constitutional
challenge to the Statute in Campbell v. Campbell, the resulting 1998
amended Statute cited favorably in Troxel v. Granville, and the
poorly timed 2000 amendment that passed while Troxel was pending
before the U.S. Supreme Court. Part IV summarizes the Troxel
holdings, addresses their incorporation into Utah’s 2002 and 2005
amendments, and analyzes the remaining precedential value of
Campbell prior to Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.). Part V
introduces Utah’s two post-Troxel grandparent visitation cases—
Pasquin v. Souter22 and Thurgood—and explores the implications of
the court’s recent decision in Thurgood. Finally, Part VI argues that
amending Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute to require a
heightened showing of harm better balances the competing interests
in grandparent visitation cases. Part VI also briefly summarizes recent
post-Troxel interpretations of state grandparent visitation statutes by
other states and, in particular, the approaches taken by states in the
Rocky Mountain area. Part VII provides a brief conclusion.
II. THE ENACTMENT AND EARLY AMENDMENT HISTORY OF
UTAH’S GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE
The origin and history of Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute
must be examined to provide needed context for asserting that the
Statute should incorporate a heightened harm standard. Because the
first reference to visitation for grandparents occurred in the context
of a Utah Code section addressing divorce proceedings, the likely
purpose of the early statute was to protect children from the harm of
losing significant extended family relationships in an increasingly
divorce-ridden society. This Part will show how both the legislature

21. The Statute’s provisions regarding adoption will not be addressed as they are
beyond the scope of this Comment.
22. Pasquin v. Souter, No. 970910481 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. July 8, 2001) (mem.), aff’d
mem., 2003 UT App 10.
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and the courts have had difficulty settling on the principles to apply
to the visitation doctrine during its early development.
By the time the first constitutional challenge to Utah’s
Grandparent Visitation Statute arose in 1995, visitation was largely
an adult-centered right that imposed few or no obligations on the
individuals awarded visitation. This led to grandparent visitation
decisions23 that were at odds with fundamental parental rights and
that were arguably far removed from the Statute’s purpose of
protecting children from the harm of losing significant extended
family relationships.
A. The 1975 Precursor to, and the 1977 Enactment of, the Utah
Grandparent Visitation Statute
In Utah, statutory “grandparent visitation” began as a segment
of the Utah Code provision dealing with divorce proceedings in a
1975 amendment to the 1969 Family Court Act.24 Prior to 1975,
the term “visitation” was completely absent from any Utah Code
section regarding children. The 1975 amendment’s provision for
child custody determinations upon divorce25 gave courts jurisdiction
over “visitation rights of parents, grandparents and other relatives”
while requiring that courts “take into consideration the welfare of
the child.” 26
Although this provision was an extension of the court’s statutory
jurisdiction over children upon divorce and not a per se
“grandparent visitation statute,” at least one case reveals that as early
as 1976 the Utah Supreme Court was aware of, and approved, the
early stages of the national grandparent visitation trend.27 In Wilson
v. Family Services Division, which was not a grandparent visitation
case,28 a grandmother was granted a hearing to determine her

23. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
24. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1953) (amended 1975); see also Family Court Act,
ch. 72, 1969 Utah Laws 327.
25. Family Court Act, ch. 72, 1969 Utah Laws 327 (codified as amended at UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(5) (2004)).
26. Act to Provide the Court with the Discretion to Award Visitation Rights to
Grandparents, ch. 81, 1975 Utah Laws 331, 332 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. §
30-3-5(5)(a) (2004)).
27. Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976). This may have been a
judicial herald of approval for grandparent visitation legislation in Utah.
28. See id. at 230–31.
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suitability to adopt her grandchild after the parental rights of the
child’s parents had been terminated.29 In reaching its decision, the
Utah Supreme Court averred in dicta that “[t]he affection of a
grandparent can safely be said to be no less in depth than parental
affection,”30 and the court favorably cited a Wisconsin case
recognizing a “grandparent’s right of visitation.”31
One year later in 1977, the legislature separately enacted what is
known today as the Grandparent Visitation Statute, codified as
section 30-5-2 of the Utah Code.32 Grandparents’ visitation rights
under the divorce proceedings section of the Family Code Act
remained intact.33 With this enactment, the legislature expanded
grandparents’ standing to bring a visitation petition to include
grandparents whose child—the parent of the grandchild—was dead
or living out of state after divorce or legal separation.34 The 1977
enactment also changed the standard for visitation decision-making
from the “welfare of the child” standard to the “best interests”
standard and gave district courts authority to “grant grandparents
reasonable rights of visitation to grandchildren, if it was in the best
interest of the grandchildren.”35
These early statutes represented an attempt to protect children
from at least some of the harmful effects of a parent’s death or
divorce by granting grandparents the ability to petition for visitation
in appropriate cases so that, when necessary, some degree of
extended family continuity could be maintained in the children’s
lives.

29. Id. at 228–29.
30. Id. at 230 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Shannon, 164 A. 352, 354
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1933)).
31. Id. (citing Weichman v. Weichman, 184 N.W.2d 882 (Wis. 1971)).
32. Grandparents’ Visitation Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566.
33. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(5)(a) (2004).
34. Grandparents’ Visitation Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566.
35. Id. Originally, the “best interest” standard was vaguely defined and could include
anything and everything the court deemed relevant. Although some statutes and courts have
attempted to outline factors to consider under a best interests analysis, see, e.g., Uzelac v.
Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 43 n.9, 144 P.3d 1083, and the weight to
be given to these factors, the standard is still quite vague and is often weighted according to
the judge’s own background and perceptions. See Jeff Atkinson, The Current Face of Best
Interests, 26-WTR FAM. ADVOC. 18 (2004).
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B. Early Indirect Interpretations Disconnecting Visitation Rights
with a Child from Obligations to the Child
There is no record of appellate-level litigation over the
Grandparent Visitation Statute for many years; in fact, in 1991 the
Utah Court of Appeals in Kasper v. Nordfelt asserted that no case
had yet construed the fourteen-year-old Grandparent Visitation
Statute.36 However, early cases that generally interpreted visitation
doctrine impacted the interpretation of the Grandparent Visitation
Statute by disconnecting visitation rights with the child from parentlike obligations to the child.37 The effect of these visitation
interpretations has been an increased emphasis on the rights and
desires of adults rather than a focus on preventing harm to children.
These changes have contributed to the current need for the Utah
legislature to refocus the Grandparent Visitation Statute on
preventing harm to children by implementing a heightened harm
standard.
Early in the evolution of the visitation doctrine, both the
legislature and the courts favored imposing parent-like obligations
and duties prior to granting a party standing to petition for visitation
privileges.38 In Gribble v. Gribble, “consideration [of] the welfare of
the child” influenced the court to consider the visitation rights of
stepparents—a class of persons traditionally and statutorily without
standing to petition for visitation.39 The court remanded for a
hearing to determine three issues: first, whether the stepfather stood
in loco parentis to the stepchild; second, whether it was in the child’s
best interest to have visitation with the stepfather; and third, whether
any visitation granted to the stepfather should be made conditional
upon accepting the responsibilities incurred by enjoying the “rights of a
natural parent.”40 Later, the Utah legislature imposed on
stepparents a legal support obligation for stepchildren and coupled
this obligation with standing to seek visitation rights in the best
interest of the child.41 Together, Gribble and the stepparent

36. 815 P.2d 747, 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
37. See In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 714–15 (Utah 1990).
38. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1987);
Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1978).
39. 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1975)).
40. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
41. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1987).
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legislation indicate early support for the idea that parent-like
obligations to the child were inseparable from visitation rights and
privileges.42
However, a few years later in In re J.W.F.,43 the Utah Supreme
Court moved away from a visitation doctrine that combined legal
support obligations with standing to petition for a custody or
visitation order.44 The court cited Utah’s Grandparent Visitation
Statute as an example of standing for visitation being based on
“status or relationship to the child” rather than on the existence of
legal obligations and responsibilities toward the child.45 As a result,
the court determined that visitation petitions by “[t]hose who have
legal or personal connections with the child” should be heard on the
basis of the child’s best interest.46 Since then, Utah’s visitation
philosophy has separated parent-like obligations from visitation
rights, following a national trend that emphasizes individual adult
rights over obligations toward children—often with detrimental
results.47
The effect of this trend encourages visitation petitioners to view
themselves as having status equal to all other persons with whom a
child has a relationship, including a child’s own biological parents.48
42. The Utah Supreme Court quoted Gribble in its recent Thurgood case: “The
[grandparent visitation statute] amendment reflected the ‘legislative intent to protect the
relationships which affect the child whose parents are being divorced, and to be sensitive to the
fact that relationships beyond those of parent-child may be important enough to protect vis-àvis visitation.’” Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 16, 144 P.3d
1083 (quoting Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66). However true this may be, this language is dicta and
should not be used in support of a broad interpretation of the grandparent visitation statute.
See Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66. Gribble was limited to addressing visitation for a stepparent who
may have engaged in significant parenting functions over a period of time on behalf of the
child and was reviewed in the context of a remand to the trial court to decide whether the
imposition of parent-like obligations on this stepfather should be inseparable from granting
him standing to seek visitation. Id. at 68.
43. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990).
44. Id. at 715.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
47. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Parenthood and the Limits of Adult Autonomy, 24 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 169 (2005); Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric:
The Constitutional Rights of Children, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 332–34 (1996).
48. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 882 (1984) (arguing that “the child’s need for continuity in intimate relationships
demands that the state provide the opportunity to maintain” such “relationships with adults
outside of nuclear families” (emphasis added)).
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As this philosophy took hold, it was not surprising that the number
of grandparent visitation lawsuits increased nationwide as some
grandparents began to feel entitled to visitation rights even over
parents’ objections.49 Unfortunately, this trend has further taken the
focus of grandparent visitation statutes away from preventing harm
to children.
C. Expansion and Retraction: The 1992, 1993, and 1995
Amendments
For unknown reasons in the early 1990s, the Utah legislature
first expanded and then retracted visitation rights available under the
Grandparent Visitation Statute. Whether or not this statutory
fiddling represented purposeful legislative efforts to experiment with
various approaches to the Statute, by 1995 the legislature had
rejected a more expansive visitation approach.
In 1992, the Statute was amended to extend standing to seek
grandparent visitation to all grandparents, not just those whose child
had died or undergone divorce or legal separation.50 Next, in 1993
“other immediate family members,” in addition to all grandparents,
were granted standing to seek visitation rights with children.51 Also,
parents became subject to the same penalties for noncompliance with
court-ordered grandparent visitation that applied to parents who
failed to comply with visitation orders with each other under the
divorce statute.52 However, in 1995 these expansions were retracted,
and once again, standing under the Grandparent Visitation Statute
was restricted to grandparents whose child had died or was deemed a
noncustodial parent following divorce.53

49. See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing
Interdependency in the Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1350–51 (1994) (suggesting that some
grandparents come to consider access to their grandchildren as a competition with the child’s
parents that they have an equal right to win).
50. Grandparents’ Rights Extended, ch. 175, 1992 Utah Laws 676.
51. Sanctions for Denial of Child Visitation, ch. 152, § 2, 1993 Utah Laws 592, 593.
52. Compare Sanctions for Denial of Child Visitation, ch. 152, § 1, 1993 Utah Laws
592, with Sanctions for Denial of Child Visitation, ch. 152, § 2, 1993 Utah Laws 593. These
penalties could include make-up visitation, requirements to participate in workshops,
counseling, classes to educate the parent about the importance of complying with the court
order, ten to twenty hours of community service, fines, jail sentences, or changes in custody.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-32-12.2 (1993) (repealed as applied to UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-5-2 by Pilot Program Repeal Clean-Up, ch. 129, § 2(6), 2005 Utah Laws 1215).
53. Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 257, 1995 Utah Laws 834.
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While no explicit reason for these changes can be found,54 it is
obvious that although the structure of the Grandparent Visitation
Statute had changed since it was enacted, the rights available under
the 1995 statute remained identical to those originally granted in the
1977 statute.55 Specifically, a reasonable right of grandparent
visitation was only available to grandparents whose child had died or
undergone divorce or legal separation, and where the visitation was
found to be in the best interest of the grandchildren.56 Presumably,
by rejecting a more expansive authorization of visitation and
returning to the Statute’s original formulation, the legislature also
affirmed its approval of the Statute’s original purpose of protecting
children from the harmful loss of significant extended family
relationships in limited circumstances. In this setting, the first case to
construe Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute and challenge its
constitutionality arose in 1995.57
III. IMPETUS FOR CHANGE: THE CAMPBELL V. CAMPBELL
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE AND THE POST-CAMPBELL
AMENDMENTS
Campbell v. Campbell represented a Utah appellate court’s first
opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the Grandparent
Visitation Statute. The court found the Statute to be constitutional,58
but in the process it ignored the Statute’s original purpose of
preventing harm to children caused by the loss of extended family
relationships.
Although the court acknowledged the constitutional concerns
presented by the Statute and imposed some limitations on its
application, the court’s statutory interpretation still authorized
substantial intrusions on parental autonomy.59 The opinion clearly
favored judicial—not parental—determination of what constitutes a

54. The author was unable to locate any legislative history of these bills or of the
sessions in which they were passed to uncover an explanation for these changes.
55. Compare Grandparents’ Visitation Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566, with
Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 257, 1995 Utah Laws 834.
56. Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 257, 1995 Utah Laws 834.
57. See Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
58. Id. at 640–44.
59. Id. at 642–43. This is true despite the court’s claim that the statute did not
“substantially infringe on the parent’s fundamental rights or the autonomy of the nuclear
family.” Id. at 642.
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child’s best interest regarding “reasonable” grandparent visitation
decisions.60
The Campbell court’s constitutional approval of the Grandparent
Visitation Statute emboldened the Utah legislature to amend it in
1998 to substantially expand grandparent visitation.61 In so doing,
the legislature actually passed a statute with text containing strong
presumptions in favor of parental autonomy that many grandparents
would have difficulty surmounting.62 Although this revision may not
have been consistent with the pro-grandparent mood reflected in the
legislative history,63 this 1998 parent-protective statute was
nevertheless the version favorably cited in the 2000 United States
Supreme Court grandparent visitation case Troxel v. Granville.64
Therefore, Campbell’s value as Utah precedent has been limited by
Troxel, as well as by subsequent Utah Grandparent Visitation Statute
amendments,65 and by the Utah Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.).66
A. Campbell v. Campbell
The ruling in Campbell seemed almost guaranteed to increase
harm—rather than prevent harm—to children. Campbell arose after
the death of Janet Campbell’s husband Kelly while she was pregnant
with the couple’s fifth child.67 Despite Janet’s willingness to allow
her children to maintain their relationships with Kelly’s parents, they
wanted more involvement in the children’s lives than Janet believed
she and the children could reasonably accommodate.68 The
60. Id. at 639. For example, Janet Campbell did not dispute that some visitation with
the grandparents was in the children’s best interest. She offered a visitation schedule that she
believed was suitable and in the best interests of her children, which was rejected by the
grandparents and the appeals court. Without evaluating Janet’s offer for objective reasonability,
the court refused to accept as “reasonable” an amount of visitation that grandparents could
receive “as a matter of grace from the parent,” id., ruling instead that the statute required the
court to make the visitation determination. Id. at 640.
61. See Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361.
62. See id.
63. See infra Part III.B–C.
64. 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000).
65. Pilot Program Repeal Clean-Up, ch. 129, 2005 Utah Laws 1215; Visitation Rights
of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298; Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 265, 2000
Utah Laws 1107.
66. 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083.
67. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
68. Id. at 637.
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grandparents, believing their visitation requests were reasonable,
became disgruntled over the boundaries Janet set and eventually filed
suit under the 1993 amendment to the Grandparent Visitation
Statute seeking a specific formal visitation schedule.69
After initially requiring Janet to “show cause why [the
grandparents] should not be granted reasonable visitation rights with
their grandchildren,” the district court ordered what it considered to
be reasonable visitation.70 After several appeals, hearings, and
stipulated orders, the grandparents, evidently attempting to assume a
quasi-parental role in the place of their deceased son, requested
vastly expanded visitation rights with the children.71 This request
intensified the district court’s “strong concerns” about the Statute’s
constitutionality and resulted in a flurry of off-the-record
consultations with counsel and Janet’s older children.72
Subsequently, the district court set forth its constitutional concerns
that the Statute infringed on parental autonomy and only issued an
order of visitation corresponding to that which Janet had previously
offered.73
1. Statutory ruling on appeal
The court of appeals analyzed the Grandparent Visitation Statute
from both a statutory and a constitutional standpoint. On a statutory
basis, the court of appeals rejected the district court’s finding that
Janet’s stipulated visitation offer was “appropriate and reasonable.”74
Instead, the court of appeals concluded that under the Statute, “the
court’s first finding, that some visitation would be in the children’s
best interests, [was] conclusory.”75 Noting that “[i]f court-ordered
69. Id.
70. Id. (granting the right to visit “every other Saturday at 9:00 a.m. until Sunday in
time for the grandchildren to attend church” and “the right ‘to visit with the grandchildren on
the telephone at reasonable times and under reasonable circumstances’”).
71. See id. at 635. This included a request for scheduled visitation every other weekend
as well as an order for visitation near each child’s birthday, every Father’s day, one day during
the children’s Thanksgiving holiday, three days during their Christmas holiday, a week during
the summer, and more. Id. at 637. They also wanted the order to approve of their request for
the children to work for the grandparents during the summers to “[assist] Janet in teaching the
children a strong work ethic.” Id.
72. Id. at 638.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 639.
75. Id.
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grandparent visitation were to be entirely dictated by the preferences
of the parent, the statute would be rendered meaningless,”76 the
court essentially held that once grandparents show that visitation is
in the children’s best interest, the court becomes the final arbiter of
what constitutes reasonable visitation.77 The mother’s visitation offer
was not considered for objective reasonability; rather, the court
outlined the following factors to consider in making a reasonable
award of visitation under the Statute: (1) the nature of the existing
grandparent-grandchild relationship, (2) the children’s preferences,
(3) the children’s relationships with each other and with other
individuals with whom children interact and to whom they may be
exposed, and (4) the fitness of all parties.78 These factors were
presented as aids to the courts in fashioning a “reasonable” visitation
award, not to aid them in making the initial determination as to
whether visitation was in the children’s best interest and should be
ordered over the parent’s wishes.
The appellate court held that making the state the proper judge
of these factors, rather than the parent, did not “substantially
infringe upon the parent’s fundamental rights or the autonomy of
the nuclear family” and that only a statute granting “unrestricted
vested right[s] of visitation” in the grandparents would raise
constitutional concerns.79 The court did require, however, that
grandparents bear the burden of proof to show that visitation was in
the children’s best interest, rather than requiring the parent to show
why visitation was not in the children’s best interest.80 Additionally,
the appellate court instructed the district court to make findings that
a visitation order would not unduly interfere with the parent-child
relationship.81

76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 640.
79. Id. at 642–43.
80. Id. at 643. While the Campbell court heralded this burden shifting as sufficiently
parent-protective, the court in Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.) acknowledged that
grandparent proof of “best interests” alone is no longer constitutionally adequate post-Troxel.
2006 UT 46, ¶ 26 n.4, 144 P.3d 1083.
81. See Campbell, 896 P.2d at 644.
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2. Constitutional ruling on appeal
From a constitutional standpoint, the court of appeals held that
the Statute passed constitutional muster on three bases: first,
constitutionally protected family relationships include grandparents
and other family members;82 second, the Statute passes a rational
basis review;83 and third, the state has a greater reason to interfere
with family autonomy when the “nuclear family has been
dissolved.”84
The district court’s conclusion that the parent-child relationship
is the only relationship given constitutional consideration in our
society was rejected by the appellate court.85 Citing Prince v.
Massachusetts86 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland87 as examples of
constitutionally protected extended family relationships, the court of
appeals essentially disregarded the parental “liberty interest . . . [in]
child-rearing autonomy” by stating that any protection of that
autonomy is a mere byproduct of “the [Supreme] Court’s larger
concern with privacy rights of the family.”88 Therefore, as long as
state intervention to preserve family relationships broader than the
parent-child relationship was not unduly burdensome, it was found
to be constitutionally permissible.89
Second, the court of appeals approved the district court’s finding
that the Statute “compromise[d] and encroached upon and is in
some ways detrimental to the relationship of authority, control, and
custody provided by the natural situation.”90 However, because the
appellate court interpreted the constitutional protection of families as
going beyond parent-child or quasi-parent-child relationships to
include extended family relationships, it only required a rational basis
standard of review for grandparent visitation cases.91 And since the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 643.
Id. at 643–44.
Id. at 640 n.9.
Id. at 639.
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Campbell, 896 P.2d at 641 n.12.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 640 n.10.
See id. at 642.
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Statute only authorized “reasonable” visitation, the appellate court
found such visitation to be rationally related to the state’s interest.92
By its own prerogative, the appellate court determined that the
state’s interest was to encourage extended family members, such as
grandparents, to play an “important role in the lives of their
grandchildren”93 and to “promote intergenerational contact and
strengthen the bonds of the extended family” given the
“disintegration of the nuclear family” occurring with regularity in
society.94 Further, the Statute was found to be reasonably related to
these hypothesized state purposes, since the Statute did not
“presume that grandparent visitation was necessarily in the children’s
best interest,” but required grandparents to demonstrate “by a
preponderance of the evidence that court-ordered visitation [was] in
the children’s best interest.”95
Third, the court of appeals rejected the district court’s
conclusion that deferring to reasonable parental decisions served the
public policy interest,96 and, therefore, the State should not infringe
“upon a parent’s right to raise his or her children” without a
showing of parental unfitness unreasonably “expos[ing] the children
to danger.”97 Instead, the appellate court simply concluded that
despite the fundamental liberty interest parents have to raise their
own children,98 “the state has a stronger argument for court
intervention to protect the extended family when the nuclear family
has been dissolved.”99 The resulting “judicial oversight” required to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law “explicitly
demonstrating that the best interests of the children will be served by
granting visitation” was thus considered adequate to protect the
“integrity of the family.”100
The court of appeals’ constitutional analysis was flawed, resulting
in Campbell’s reduced precedential importance and, more
importantly, lessening the Grandparent Visitation Statute’s

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 640 (quoting Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 580 n.10 (Tenn. 1993)).
Id. at 643.
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effectiveness at balancing the harms facing children who are the
subject of grandparent visitation disputes.
3. Flaws in the Campbell analysis
Three flaws in the appellate court’s constitutional analysis
resulted in an inappropriate statutory interpretation. The flaws
include: (1) an overly broad conception of constitutional protection
for extended families, (2) an arguably incorrect hypothesis about the
Statute’s purpose, and (3) a failure to accord a fit single parent the
same constitutional protection as parents in an intact family.
a. An overly broad conception of constitutional protection for
extended families. First, the court’s use of Prince and Moore to
support constitutionally protected extended family relationships
failed to consider that in those cases, the extended family members
were acting in loco parentis toward the children at issue.101 Prince
involved an aunt who was the custodian of her nine-year-old niece,
whose health and safety the court considered at risk as a consequence
of street tracting.102 This risk of harm to the child justified state
intervention in the quasi-parent-child relationship to prohibit the
street tracting.103 Prince does not support the contradictory
proposition of the Campbell court that extended constitutional
protection to broader family member relationships, because those
relationships are not all parental or quasi-parental relationships, as
was the case in Prince.104
Moore, in a similar manner, involved a boy living with his thencustodial grandmother after the death of his mother.105 His presence
in the apartment violated a family housing ordinance that the court
found unconstitutional because it impermissibly restricted the
definition of family by excluding extended family households.106 The
Supreme Court in Moore spoke of providing constitutional

101. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 n.16 (1977); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 160–63 (1944).
102. Prince, 321 U.S. at 160–63. The aunt and the niece were Jehovah’s Witnesses who
distributed religious pamphlets on city streets. Id. at 161.
103. Id. at 169–70.
104. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 642–43.
105. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 n.16.
106. Id. at 505.
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protection for a “larger conception of the family”;107 however, that
language must be judged in the context of the case’s facts. This was a
grandmother in a quasi-parental relationship with her grandson. The
grandmother was essentially the boy’s guardian after his mother’s
death—sharing the same household was a protective circumstance in
this case that the child’s mother would undoubtedly have welcomed
and approved. It was a questionable stretch by the Campbell court to
apply Moore’s “larger conception of the family” language to
constitutionally protect a grandparent-grandchild relationship
without similar compelling circumstances and in the face of parental
opposition. Arguably, expanding constitutional protection for
extended family relationships in very factually different grandparent
visitation cases will result in state intrusion that constitutes the undue
burden forbidden by the court of appeals under rational basis
review.108
b. An arguably incorrect hypothesis about the statute’s purpose. The
court of appeals hypothesized that the legislative purpose for the
Grandparent Visitation Statute was to “promote intergenerational
contact and strengthen the bonds of the extended family”109 by
permitting grandparents to play an “important role in the lives of
their grandchildren.”110 The court of appeals offered no evidence to
support its expansive and sentimental interpretation of the Statute’s
purpose. Instead, the origin and history of the Statute suggest that
its purpose was limited to protecting children from the harm of
losing established and significant extended family relationships upon
the death or divorce of a parent.111 Further, this interpretation of the
Statute’s purpose is also more consistent with broader state family
law doctrines112 and with constitutional principles that permit state
107. Id.
108. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 642 (stating that heightened scrutiny is required when “state
interference ‘interfere[s] substantially’ or ‘heavily burden[s]’ fundamental rights”).
109. Id. at 643.
110. Id. at 642 (citing Moore, 431 U.S. 494).
111. Yet even state intervention to prevent harm was not necessary in the Campbell case,
where the children were in no significant danger of losing their extended family relationships.
112. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-102 (2003) (discussing abuse, dependency, and
neglect proceedings); Id. § 30-3-5 (2003) (discussing visitation upon divorce). The principles
underlying these statutes serve to protect children from harm while preserving parental rights
to the fullest extent possible. These doctrines have little to no focus on promoting the desires
of adults at the expense of children.
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intervention into family life when necessary to protect children from
harm.113
The court of appeals’ decision is at odds with United States
Supreme Court decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska,114 Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters,115 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,116 which all represent a longstanding constitutional doctrine that protects parental decisionmaking from state interference where the parents’ decisions are not
“inherently harmful.”117 And—although the general evolution of
visitation doctrine in Utah has tended to equate the parental role
with the status and relationship roles of non-parental visitation
petitioners—as seen earlier,118 the court of appeals did not analyze or
discuss whether this equation is constitutionally accurate. In fact, in
the absence of a quasi-parental role played by a grandparent, the
parent-child relationship does receive constitutional protections that
are unavailable to the grandparent-grandchild relationship, as the
United States Supreme Court indicated when it decided Troxel.119
Moreover, the court of appeals’ hypothesized purposes make the
Grandparent Visitation Statute both under- and over-inclusive; the
Statute does not apply to grandparents of children in intact families
who seek to play an “important role” in the lives of their
grandchildren, nor does it foster “intergenerational contact”
between grandparents and grandchildren when it would be in the
child’s best interest but the grandparent is simply not interested in
participating. While a rational basis review does not require such
congruence, a review under a heightened standard does. And since
the parent-child relationship is a fundamental liberty protected by
the Constitution,120 the court of appeals should have applied a
113. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. 494; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
114. 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923) (recognizing that parents have the right to decide to
have their children taught the German language because it “is not injurious to the health,
morals or understanding” of the children).
115. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (refusing to interfere with parents’ decision to send their
children to private schools rather than public schools because there was no evidence the
children would be harmed by private school attendance).
116. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (refusing to compel Amish parents to educate their
children in public schools rather than receive an Amish education because an Amish education
would not be harmful to the children).
117. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
118. See supra Part II.B.
119. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000); see also infra Part IV.
120. The parent-child relationship is protected under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
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heightened standard of review, under which the court’s hypothesized
purpose for the Grandparent Visitation Statute would not have
survived.
Finally, the court of appeals’ grandparent-centered conception of
the Statute’s purpose makes it far more likely that courts will find
grandparent visitation to be in the children’s “best interest” and
result in an intrusive visitation order the court finds “reasonable.”
Under the appellate court’s conception, grandparents stand on
essentially equal constitutional footing with parents. This concept
fails to consider that parents have obligations and responsibilities to
both the child and the state that are not shared by extended family
members. This consideration alone makes the court’s expansive
hypothesis about the Statute’s purpose inappropriate to justify state
intervention in parental decisions.
c. Failure to accord a fit single parent the same constitutional
protection as parents in an intact family. The third flaw in the
Campbell court’s analysis is its constitutional conclusion that “the
state has a stronger argument for court intervention to protect the
extended family when the nuclear family has been dissolved.”121 This
conclusion was based on dicta found in a footnote in Hawk v. Hawk,
the case that struck down Tennessee’s grandparent statute as
unconstitutional because it did not require a showing of harm to the
children if grandparent visitation were not ordered.122 The holding in
Hawk actually required a two-part analysis prior to an order of
visitation: (1) an initial showing of harm to the child, and only then
(2) a consideration of whether the “best interests of the child”
support a visitation order.123
In order to be consistent with its holding, Hawk’s dicta124 must
logically only apply to the second part of its analysis—nuclear family
breakdown as a factor to consider in the best interest analysis. The
Campbell court used it out of context to justify state intrusion on
single parent autonomy for the benefit of adult extended family
members rather than to benefit children who may suffer significant
harm caused by dissolving family relationships. Further, the
121. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Hawk v.
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 580 n.10 (Tenn. 1993)).
122. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580–81.
123. Id. at 580.
124. Id. at 580 n.10.

1688

SCHOFIELD.MRO.COM

1669]

1/23/2007 2:16:44 PM

Interpreting Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute

Campbell court failed even to apply the Hawk dicta to the facts of its
case: it promoted extended family relationships at the expense of a
widowed mother’s authority, even when her husband’s death did not
place the children at any risk of losing their relationships with their
father’s extended family.
d. Other flaws in Campbell. In addition to the above, the
Campbell decision was flawed because it increased the likelihood that
children would be harmed by court-ordered grandparent visitation.
Sociological studies and anecdotal evidence of parental visitation
orders on divorce reveal that court-ordered visitation is intrusive and
often harmful for all parties involved, including the children it was
intended to protect.125 The justification for state intrusion despite
this harm in cases of divorce is largely based on the parents’ co-equal
rights and responsibilities as well as the child’s greater need for a
continuing relationship with both parents.
With grandparent visitation outside of a quasi-parental setting,
the grandparents’ rights and responsibilities are not co-equal with
the parents’; therefore, the only justification for an intrusive visitation
order is when the harm created by such an order is outweighed by
the harm to a child that would result without an order. When
determining visitation “reasonability” when the parties do not have
equal rights and responsibilities, the Campbell court’s grandparentcentered interpretation fails to consider the inherent harms of
visitation orders.
B. Legislative Incorporation of Campbell into the 1998 Amendment
As a result of the court of appeals’ pro-grandparent decision in
Campbell, the Utah legislature voted to expand the Grandparent
Visitation Statute in 1998 to “keep adults letting adults in[to] the
lives of children.”126 Sponsored by nearly half of the House

125. See generally Nolan, supra note 4, at 281–88. Visitation orders result in a multitude
of issues between often hostile parties that require ongoing court intervention, such as (1) the
duration, location, logistics, and possible supervision of visits; (2) modification orders as
circumstances change, relocation problems, and the potential impact of multiple visitation
orders; as well as (3) parental sanctions for violation of a visitation order. Id. at 269; see also
Newman, supra note 4, at 21.
126. Utah House Floor Debate (Audio Recording), 52d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 26,
1998),
http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=1998GS&Day=39&Bill=&
House=H (statement of Rep. Buffmire).
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membership127 and abandoning a focus on preventing harm to
children, the bill added a new section to the Statute which gave
standing to seek grandparent visitation to all grandparents, not just
those whose child had died or been divorced.128
In doing so, however, the legislature acknowledged one
important check on state intrusion into parental autonomy provided
by the Campbell decision.129 This check required that grandparents
bear the burden of proof to show that visitation was in the best
interest of the children rather than by requiring the parent to show
why visitation was not in the children’s best interest.130 This was
referred to by the legislators as presuming parents’ “basic interests,”
and the amendment went on to outline five factors grandparents
could use to rebut the presumption that a parent’s grandparent
visitation decision was reasonable.131
However, these “basic interests” were only protected for certain
parents. The legislature apparently noted Campbell’s holding that
state intrusion on parental decision-making authority was appropriate
as long as a family was not intact, even when children were at no risk
of harm from the loss of extended family relationships. This is true
because the original statutory language in section 1 was retained,
which “grant[ed] grandparents reasonable rights of visitation, if it is

127. House Bill 136 (Grandparents Visitation Rights) was sponsored by twenty-eight
representatives. See An Act Relating to Grandparents; Expanding the Rights of Grandparents
to Seek Court-Ordered Visitation, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361.
128. Id.
129. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
130. Id. at 643. While the Campbell court heralded this burden shifting as sufficiently
parent-protective, the court in Thurgood acknowledged that grandparent proof of “best
interests” alone is no longer constitutionally adequate post-Troxel. See Uzelac v. Thurgood (In
re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 26 n.4, 144 P.3d 1083.
131. An Act Relating to Grandparents; Expanding the Rights of Grandparents to Seek
Court-Ordered Visitation, ch. 104, 1998 Utah Laws 361. The factors were as follows:
(a) [visitation] is in the best interest of the grandchild; (b) the petitioner is a fit and
proper person to have rights of visitation with the grandchild; (c) the petitioner has
repeatedly attempted to visit the grandchild and has not been allowed to visit the
grandchild as a direct result of the actions of the parent or parents; (d) there is no
other way for the petitioner to visit the grandchild without court intervention; and
(e) the petitioner has, by clear and convincing evidence, rebutted the presumption
that the parent’s decision to refuse or limit visitation with the grandchild was
reasonable.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(e) (1998).
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in the best interest of the grandchildren” for grandparents whose
children had died or been divorced.132
By retaining this language and making section 1 independent,
the amendment subjected children whose parents had died or
divorced to the same Grandparent Visitation Statute interpreted
under Campbell. This meant that without any consideration of the
potential harm faced by children, the court would determine a
“reasonable” visitation award under a very expansive statutory
purpose favoring grandparents as long as grandparents showed by a
preponderance of the evidence that visitation was in the best interest
of the child.133
For children in intact families, however, the 1998 amendment
established a presumption in favor of the parent’s decision to limit or
refuse visitation. It gave grandparents the burden of proving both
that visitation was in the best interest of the children and that the
parent’s decision was unreasonable by “clear and convincing”
evidence134 rather than by Campbell’s mere “preponderance of the
evidence.”
Additionally, this section of the amendment reflected Campbell’s
factual underpinnings as well as its holdings in three of the factors
grandparents could use to establish that visitation was in the child’s
best interest and that the parent’s visitation decision was
unreasonable:135 (1) the grandparent seeking visitation must be a “fit
and proper person,” (2) the grandparent must have repeatedly
attempted and been disallowed visitation with the children, and (3)
only a court order will result in parental compliance with
grandparent visitation requests.136 Had these factors been applied in
Janet Campbell’s case, it is unlikely that the court would have
overridden Janet’s reasonable visitation offers.137
The United States Supreme Court favorably cited this newly
amended section of Utah’s 1998 statute in its landmark grandparent

132. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(1).
133. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 642–43.
134. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(e).
135. Daren G. Mortenson, Recent Developments in Utah Law, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 703,
797.
136. An Act Relating to Grandparents; Expanding the Rights of Grandparents to Seek
Court-Ordered Visitation, ch. 104, § 30-5-2(2)(b)–(d), 1998 Utah Laws 361.
137. Janet had never prohibited her children’s visits with their paternal grandparents, so
court intervention was not the only way for the grandparents to see their grandchildren.
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visitation case Troxel v. Granville.138 Additionally and significantly, in
Troxel the Supreme Court applied a nearly identical presumption
favoring the grandparent visitation decision of a single mother whose
children’s father had died.139 This suggests that the decision of the
district judge respecting a widowed mother’s visitation decision in
Campbell was more constitutionally accurate than the decision of the
appellate court and that the legislature’s reliance on Campbell to
apply a far lesser standard of proof to non-intact families was
constitutionally infirm. Nonetheless, while the Troxel opinion was
pending, the legislature attempted to go one step further than the
Campbell decision and erode even the parental presumptions
favoring intact families.
C. The Ill-Timed 2000 Amendment
Of all the Grandparent Visitation Statute amendments the Utah
legislature had passed to date, the 2000 amendment was the least
parent-protective and the least focused on preventing harm to
children. Despite Troxel pending before the United States Supreme
Court, sponsors in the legislature proposed a bill that would have
eliminated the parental presumption of reasonableness in all cases
except those where the nuclear family remained intact.140
The proposed bill would have allowed a court to override any
parent’s grandparent visitation decision based on its own
determination of “the best interest of the grandchild.”141 After
legislative review noted that the bill raised constitutional concerns
about parental autonomy, and because the Troxel case was pending
before the United States Supreme Court,142 the legislature rejected
this language and considered several modifications. Eventually, the
138. 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000).
139. 530 U.S. at 68.
140. An Act Relating to Grandparents; Clarifying Grandparents’ Standing to Bring an
Action in District Court; and Removing the Statutory Presumption Regarding a Parent’s
Decision, S. 166, 53d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2000), available at http://www.le.state.ut.us/
~2000/htmdoc/Sbillhtm/SB0166.htm (including bill as originally proposed). The author’s
survey of cases available for review in Lexis-Nexis indicates that grandparent visitation cases
involving intact families remain the minority of cases. Furthermore, with Campbell as
precedent, it is arguably true that had this amendment passed, even intact nuclear families
would have been at risk for routine rebuttal of the parental presumption.
141. Id.
142. The legislative history for Utah Senate Bill 166 can be found at http://
www.le.state.ut.us/~2000/bills/sbillamd/SB0166.pdf.
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enacted amendment defined a “grandparent” with standing to
petition for visitation to include biological grandparents, adoptive
grandparents, and persons whose child, by marriage, is the parent of
the grandchildren—presumably step-grandparents.143 Additionally, it
eliminated the “clear and convincing evidence” standard required for
a grandparent to rebut the parental presumption of reasonability.144
By expanding the number of adults with standing to seek
visitation while eliminating the heightened standard for rebutting a
parent’s visitation decision, the amendment disregarded parents’
rights and increased the likelihood that children would be harmed by
becoming the focus of visitation battles. Yet, during the minimal
legislative floor debates on this amendment, no legislator expressed
any concern about respect for parental autonomy.145 One legislator
mischaracterized the amendment as merely providing courts with the
ability to consider a grandparent’s bonded relationship with a
grandchild in cases of death or divorce.146 But the legislature had
already authorized courts to consider bonded relationships with
grandparents in cases of death and divorce since at least 1977.147
Two other legislators made emotional appeals in support of the
bill, the first supporting the amendment as a means to prevent
grandparents from being “punished along with the children” when
the parents of the grandchildren undergo a divorce.148 The second
appeal, which was representative of the general legislative mood
during floor debate on this bill, extolled the virtues of “extended
families in dealing with the nurturing and upbringing of children”
and stated that the bill “highlights the importance” of the “vital role
of grandparents”149 (language remarkably similar to that employed

143. Grandparents Visitation Rights, ch. 265, § 3, 2000 Utah Laws 1107.
144. Id.
145. Utah House Floor Debate (Audio Recording), 53d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 28,
2000), http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2000GS&Day=0&Bill=SB0166
S01&House=H [hereinafter 2000 Floor Debate].
146. See id.
147. See Grandparents’ Visitation Rights, ch. 123, 1977 Utah Laws 566 (allowing
grandparents, defined as persons whose child—deceased or divorced—is the parent of the child
with whom visitation is being sought, to sue at law for visitation rights).
148. 2000 Floor Debate, supra note 145 (statement of Rep. Bilrey).
149. Id. (statement of Rep. Harper).
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by the court in Campbell).150 The legislature was apparently heavily
weighted in favor of grandparents’ interests; before the final vote was
taken on the bill, thirty-eight senators, in a jovial atmosphere,
registered “conflicts” to the bill by proudly announcing that they
were grandparents or grandparents-to-be.151
This legislative history reveals that not only were the provisions
of the easily passed 2000 amendment not well understood, but that
no consideration was given to the important interests at stake for
parents and children. Consequently, Utah law after Campbell and the
post-Campbell amendments subjected even reasonable parental
decisions about grandparent visitation to scrutiny and potential
overturn by a court in every case where death or divorce impacted a
family. For all other families, fit grandparents who provided evidence
of repeatedly limited or denied attempts to visit their grandchildren,
even if reasonably limited or denied, were likely to obtain a visitation
order by persuading a court by a mere preponderance of the
evidence that visitation was in the grandchild’s best interest.
This is due to Campbell’s instruction for courts to interpret the
Statute in light of the state’s interest in promoting the “important”
role of grandparents,152 making it more likely that a court would find
visitation to be in a child’s best interest. This, in turn, would be
enough to rebut the parental presumption. Fortunately for parents
and children, the Campbell interpretation and the 2000 amendment
were severely undermined when the United States Supreme Court
released its decision in Troxel v. Granville, which while not requiring
a heightened harm standard, permits and may even encourage one.
IV. THE IMPACT OF TROXEL V. GRANVILLE ON UTAH’S
GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE
Troxel v. Granville placed important limitations on state
grandparent visitation statutes to protect families from the harm of
violating parents’ fundamental liberties in the “care, custody, and
control of their children . . . .”153 The Supreme Court’s decision

150. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (“[G]randparents
are members of the extended family whom society recognizes as playing an important role in
the lives of their grandchildren . . . .”).
151. 2000 Floor Debate, supra note 145.
152. See Campbell, 896 P.2d at 642.
153. 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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impacted grandparent visitation statutes in all fifty states, and many
state statutes have been amended or judicially reinterpreted after
Troxel.154
Utah’s statute has been similarly impacted by Troxel. After
Troxel, a 2002 amendment to the Statute reinstated the presumption
of reasonableness in favor of all parents’ visitation decisions and
suggested that courts consider the possibility that a denial of
visitation might harm the child when determining whether the
grandparents have rebutted that presumption.155 Additionally, a
recent Utah Supreme Court decision that awarded grandparent
visitation emphasized a district court’s finding that a denial of
visitation rights would harm the particular child in question.156
A brief discussion of the Troxel opinions is necessary to
appreciate the impact they had on the Campbell holding, the 2002
amendment, and the Thurgood holding. This section will then
consider Utah’s post-Troxel amendments, which incorporate Troxel
and certain Campbell holdings into the 2002 Grandparent Visitation
Statute. These amendments render the current Statute facially
compliant with both federal and state constitutional precedents and
arguably establish, as a practical matter, that grandparent visitation
orders will not be made without a showing that the child would be
harmed by a denial of visitation.157
Troxel v. Granville involved the challenge of a Washington
statute permitting “any person” at “any time” to petition for
visitation rights with a child under a “best interests” standard.158
Tommie Granville, a woman who never married the father of her
two daughters, contested the statute when the paternal grandparents
became unhappy with the frequency and duration of visitation
Granville offered them after the father committed suicide.159 The
father’s parents, the Troxels, had established a relationship with the
girls during the father’s twice-monthly custodial weekends prior to
his death and on a similar basis for some months after his death.160
154. See infra Part VI.C.
155. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298.
156. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083.
157. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298.
158. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE §
26.10.160(3) (1994)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 61.
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However, after Granville married and established a new family unit,
she informed the Troxels that she would prefer that the girls visit
only once per month.161 The Troxels objected to this limitation, filed
suit under the Washington statute, and the court eventually awarded
them additional visitation against Granville’s wishes.162
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute
was an unconstitutional infringement on parental autonomy because
it permitted the state to intervene with fundamental parental rights
without a showing of harm to the child if the state did not
intervene.163 It also held that the statute was overbroad, permitting
any person at any time to force the parents to undergo judicial
review of their decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of
their children.164 This decision was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.165
A. Troxel’s Constitutional Requirements
Troxel was a 4+1+1-3 decision, with the four Justices making up
the plurality opinion declaring the statute unconstitutional as the
statute was applied to Ms. Granville and her children.166 Two of the
three dissenting Justices similarly dissented on a statutory basis.167
The remaining Justices wrote concurring or dissenting opinions
specifically on the basis of constitutional reasoning and
interpretation.168 Because the decision has no majority opinion and
many Justices wrote separate opinions, the holding of the Court in
Troxel is complicated and warrants careful analysis.
The plurality in Troxel declined to invalidate grandparent
visitation statutes in all fifty states on a per se basis. Rather, the
plurality discussed missing statutory elements that could render state
grandparent visitation statutes constitutional.169 These elements
included limits on third party standing to subject parental visitation
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 63.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 73.
167. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 93
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 67 (plurality opinion).
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decisions to state court review170 and “special weight” or deference
to be granted to the parent’s visitation decision.171 It was in this
context that the Court favorably cited Utah’s 1998 statute for
establishing a presumption in favor of the parent’s visitation decision
that could only be rebutted by “clear and convincing evidence.”172
Additionally, statutes may constitutionally consider the parent’s
fitness to make a visitation decision.173 Whether the grandparents had
previously been offered a reasonable amount of visitation may also be
a consideration.174
Justice Stevens dissented from this enumeration of statutory
factors that would render state grandparent visitation statutes
constitutional.175 He objected to even considering a statute’s
constitutionality before an appeals court had determined the
adequacy of the trial court’s findings.176 He further argued that the
“best interest” standard alone is not necessarily unconstitutional,
particularly when other persons have an established relationship with
the child that justifies limiting parental autonomy.177 Citing Michael
H. v. Gerald D. as an example,178 Justice Stevens argued that parental
interests could appropriately be limited when necessary to consider
the independent interest of the family.179
Justice Scalia’s dissent essentially abdicated from the
constitutional debate because parental rights are not enumerated in
the Constitution and because Washington’s grandparent visitation

170. Id.
171. Id. at 70.
172. Id. at 70 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(e) (1998)).
173. Id. at 67.
174. Id. at 71.
175. Id. at 82–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 86–87.
178. Id. at 87 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)).
179. Id. at 87–88. However, this is not an apt comparison since the holding in Michael
H. prevented an outsider (a biological parent, no less) from disrupting a nuclear family,
whereas in Troxel, a nuclear family was being disrupted by a nonparent. See Michael H., 491
U.S. at 124. Further, Michael H. involved competing parental claims from men both willing to
undertake the responsibilities and rights of fatherhood, whereas Troxel involved a contest
between a parent and an extended family member who was not seeking parental rights and
responsibilities but merely rights without responsibilities. See id. at 126–27.
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statute was enacted by duly elected representatives.180 Thus, he
would have simply upheld the statute.181
The two concurring opinions by Justices Thomas and Souter
concurred with the plurality in affirming the Washington Supreme
Court’s invalidation of the state’s grandparent visitation statute, but
they did so on a constitutional, rather than a statutory, basis.182
Justice Thomas’s opinion strongly supported parental autonomy as a
fundamentally privileged right. Since parents have a fundamental
right to “direct the upbringing of their children,” Justice Thomas
argued that any state intervention should be subject to “strict
scrutiny” before “second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding
visitation with third parties.”183
Justice Souter observed that the Washington Supreme Court’s
decision was consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior
precedent protecting fundamental parental rights from state
intervention and found that no further delineation of the precise
scope of the parents’ rights or protections was necessary.184 However,
he did imply that another factor may be relevant: whether an existing
substantial relationship with the child deserves protection.185
Justice Kennedy’s dissent, based on constitutional grounds, also
suggested that legitimate and established relationships, especially
parent-like relationships, should be protected even over the parents’
objection.186 However, he was not certain that the “best interest”
test provided sufficient constitutional protection for parental
autonomy.187 He was also the only Justice to point out that
grandparent visitation litigation itself may be so disruptive to parents
that the parents need constitutional protection.188

180. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile I would think it entirely
compatible with the commitment to representative democracy set forth in [our] founding
documents to argue, in legislative chambers or electoral campaigns, that the State has no power
to interfere with parents’ authority over the rearing of their children, I do not believe that the
power which the Constitution confers on me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws
that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) an unenumerated right.”).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 75–80 (Souter, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 76 (Souter, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 77.
186. Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 101.
188. Id.
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Due to the complexity of the separate opinions in the Troxel
decision, the following table summarizes the positions of the
members of the Court regarding the necessary factors for state
grandparent visitation statutes to pass constitutional muster:
Factors
Broadness
limited
Deference
to parent’s
decision
Parental
fitness
Denial of all
visitation
requests
Requires a
showing of
harm to
child
Established,
substantial
relationship
protected
Changed
circumstances
Child’s
preferences
considered
Broader
definition of
“family”
protected

Plurality

Souter

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Thomas

Stevens

Scalia

Kennedy

By
implication

Yes

By
implication

Yes

By
implication

Yes

Probably
—strict
scrutiny

No

Covered
in “best
interest”

Yes

Yes

Yes

Didn’t
reach

Didn’t
reach

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Factors
More
weight to
state’s
parens
patriae
powers
against
arbitrary
parental
decisions
Parental
protection
from
litigation

Plurality

Souter

Thomas

Stevens

Scalia

Kennedy

Yes

Yes

As can be seen, there was strong support for the first three
factors addressed in the plurality opinion (broadness of standing
limited (6-3), deference to the parent’s decision (7-2), and parental
fitness to make a visitation decision (6-3)). Constitutionally
protected third-party visitation with children in substantial,
established relationships against the parent’s wishes did not receive
majority support (3-6), a fact that may have significance in related
visitation decisions pending in Utah courts.189
The most significant question in Troxel for the purposes of this
Comment is the one that was not really answered: whether a
showing of harm to the child without a visitation order is required
before grandparent visitation may constitutionally be ordered against
the parent’s wishes. Justice Stevens expressly rejected this
requirement,190 and, at the other extreme, Justice Thomas implicitly
required nothing short of harm to overcome a strict scrutiny
analysis.191 The remaining Justices may have discussed—but
ultimately did not require—a statutory harm element because the
189. See, e.g., Jones v. Barlow, No. 20040932 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2005). In this
case, the former lesbian partner of the biological mother of a three-year-old child was granted
parental status and visitation by a district court judge. Id. On appeal, the mother challenges
both the parental status determination and the third party visitation order. Id.
190. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Constitution’s silence about parental rights made this factor fall
within an acceptable constitutional range that, as related to domestic
law, is best determined by individual state legislatures.192 Several
Justices expressed concern about the Troxel decision ushering in
federal family law, an area of regulation historically and appropriately
left to the states.193 As discussed below, the Utah legislature chose to
include a harm factor in its post-Troxel amendment, a fact that was
given due consideration in the Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Grandparent Visitation Statute in Thurgood.194
B. Campbell as Precedent After Troxel: Incorporation of Campbell
and Troxel into the 2002 and 2005 Amendments
Troxel halted the swift expansion of grandparent and other thirdparty visitation rights in many states, including Utah. Courts and
legislatures were now required to carefully consider parents’
fundamental rights and were advised to more carefully consider the
impact of grandparent visitation statutes on children. Key portions of
Utah’s Campbell case were effectively overruled, and the Utah
legislature amended the Grandparent Visitation Statute to reflect
Troxel considerations, including the fact that grandparents may need
to show that the child would be harmed without a visitation order.195
Troxel invalidated Campbell’s conclusion196 that courts have the
prerogative to determine reasonable grandparent visitation and that a
court’s decision supersedes the visitation decision made by a fit

192. Id. at 73 (plurality opinion); id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 93 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 73 (plurality opinion) (explaining that whether any specific grandparent
visitation statute violates the Constitution depends on how it is applied and that “[b]ecause
much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be
hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a
per se matter.”); id. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is indisputably the business of the States,
rather than a federal court employing a national standard, to assess in the first instance the
relative importance of the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes such as this.”); id. at 93
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I think it obvious—whether we affirm or reverse the judgment here
. . . that we will be ushering in a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed,
family law.”); id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The protection the Constitution requires,
then, must be elaborated with care, [and] we must keep in mind that family courts in the 50
States . . . are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues that arise.”).
194. See infra Part V.B.
195. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, § 30-5-2(2)(d), 2002 Utah Laws 298.
196. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 639, 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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parent under a “best interest” standard.197 Troxel clearly rejected
state interference that amounts to little more than substituting a
judge’s visitation decision for a fit parent’s visitation decision when
there are no factors that rebut the parental presumption of
reasonability.198
Further, Troxel rejected Campbell’s suggestion199 that the state
can intervene with a lesser showing of deference when the nuclear
family is dissolved.200 Troxel afforded the same parental presumption
to the visitation decision of Tommie Granville, an unwed mother
whose nuclear family was not intact, as it required states to afford to
all other parents.201 Therefore, Troxel effectively overruled
Campbell’s conclusion that “promot[ing] intergenerational contact
and strengthen[ing] the bonds of the extended family” are enough
justification for the state to intrude on parental autonomy regardless
of whether the family is intact.202 However, before any Utah
appellate-level grandparent visitation cases arose after Troxel to
confirm these conclusions about Campbell, the Utah legislature
amended the Grandparent Visitation Statute.203
Following Troxel’s favorable citation to Utah’s parent-protective
1998 statutory provisions, the Utah legislature recognized that the
ill-timed 2000 amended statute “did not give proper deference to
the opinions of parents regarding the issue of grandparent
visitation.”204 Accordingly, in a much more somber legislative
atmosphere than existed when the 2000 amendment was passed,205
the legislature revised the Statute in 2002 to reflect Troxel’s holding
that “parents are the proper ones to raise children” and are presumed

197. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68, 72–73 (plurality opinion).
198. Id. at 72–73 (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the
fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge
believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”).
199. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 640 n.9 (quoting Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 580 n.10
(Tenn. 1993)).
200. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69–70 (plurality opinion).
201. Id.
202. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 643.
203. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, 2002 Utah Laws 298 (amending sections
30-5-1 and 30-5-2 of the Utah Code).
204. See Utah House Floor Debate (Audio Recording), 53d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 27,
2002), http://www.le.state.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2002GS&Day=0&Bill=SB0087
S01&House=H (statement of Rep. Urquhart).
205. See id.
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to “act in the child’s best interest.”206 The new Statute contained a
presumption in favor of parents’ decisions that grandparents may
only rebut based on factors defined by the amendment.207 It
therefore appears clear that the legislature intended the new
amendment to protect parents’ fundamental rights and obligations
to make decisions regarding when and with whom their children may
visit. At the same time, the amendment provided a means unavailable
at common law for grandparents to override a parent’s unreasonable
visitation decision when necessary for the children’s welfare.208
In the process of enacting the 2002 amendment, the legislature
considered an initial bill that proposed emphasizing the “special
weight” to be accorded to a parent’s decision.209 However, after
several revisions and a bill substitution, the amendment restored
language similar to the favorably cited 1998 statute presuming that
“a parent’s decision with regard to grandparent visitation is in the
grandchild’s best interests.”210 The 2002 amendment also
incorporated all of the Troxel plurality’s statutory guidelines into its
factors by which the parental presumption may be rebutted.211 It
limited broadness by allowing only grandparents to seek visitation
under the statute212 and only against the parent’s wishes in defined
circumstances that require the court to make findings.213 A fit and
competent parent’s decision was granted deference.214 And, it
posited that when a fit parent offers some amount of visitation to the
grandparent, the court must make other significant findings before
overriding the parent’s decision as unreasonable.215
206. Id. The remainder of the House floor discussion on this amendment consisted solely
of one representative relating the unhappy experience of a constituent parent who had had very
little influence or recourse when a court ordered grandparent visitation, against her wishes, to
her child’s paternal grandmother, a woman convicted on several drug charges and whose son
was currently in jail for committing two public shootings and an additional shooting while on
probation. Id. (statement of Rep. Wallace).
207. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(g), 2002 Utah Laws
298.
208. Id.
209. S. 87 Substitute, 2002 Gen. Sess., at line 50 (Utah 2001), available at http://
www.le.state.ut.us/~2002/htmdoc/sbillhtm/sb0087s1.htm.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part IV.
212. Visitation Rights of Grandparents, ch. 85, § 30-5-2(1), 2002 Utah Laws 298.
213. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(g).
214. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(c).
215. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(a)–(g).
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In addition to incorporating the Troxel plurality’s statutory
guidelines, the factors discussed in the Troxel concurrences and
dissents are also represented in the statute. The 2002 amendment
provides that the court may consider an established, parent-like
relationship as a factor in deciding whether to override a parent’s
unreasonable visitation decision.216 Most importantly, the Utah
legislature chose to require courts to consider whether the children
would be harmed without a visitation order.217 Finally, even some of
Campbell’s standards are represented in the amendment, such as
consideration of the nature of the existing relationship and the
fitness of all parties.218 In summary, the current statutory provisions,
as amended in 2002, are presented below, with the apparent source
noted in brackets:
(a) The petitioner is a fit and proper person to have visitation with
the grandchild [Campbell, 1998 statute, Troxel];
(b) Visitation with the grandchild has been denied or unreasonably
limited [1998 statute, Troxel];
(c) The parent is unfit or incompetent [Campbell, Troxel];
(d) The petitioner has acted as the grandchild’s custodian or
caregiver, or otherwise has had a substantial relationship with the
grandchild [Campbell, Troxel], and the loss or cessation of that
relationship is likely to cause harm to the grandchild [Troxel];
(e) The petitioner’s child, who is a parent of the grandchild, has
died, or has become a noncustodial parent through divorce or legal
separation [1977 statute];
(f) The petitioner’s child, who is a parent of the grandchild, has
been missing for an extended period of time [new];
or

216. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(b), (d).
217. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(d).
218. Id. § 30-5-2(2)(a), (d); see Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 640 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995).
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(g) Visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild [Common to
all previous versions, Campbell, and Troxel].219

In addition to the Campbell holdings that survived Troxel and
were incorporated into the current amendment, three other
Campbell factors survived and appear to remain good law in Utah.
First, courts may continue to consider the preferences of the children
as well as the children’s relationships with each other and others to
whom they will be exposed,220 factors that Campbell instructed
courts to consider once it determined that a visitation order was
appropriate.221 Second, courts must still make findings that a
visitation order would not unduly interfere with the parent-child
relationship.222
Third, without making any substantive changes to the 2002
statute, the 2005 Grandparent Visitation Statute amendment
repealed the parental sanctions provision established in the 1993
amendment under pilot program section 78-32-12.2,223 presumably
leaving the court free to use its other remedial powers against parents
in contempt of a visitation order.224
The calculus of which of these 2002 statutory factors carries the
most weight in individual grandparent visitation cases was an issue of
substantial concern to the Utah Supreme Court in Thurgood.225
However, the Statute’s final provision, which authorizes grandparent
visitation rights when “visitation is in the best interest of the
grandchild,” is clearly no longer sufficient justification alone for a
visitation order.226
After many efforts by both courts and legislators to strike an
appropriate balance between the competing interests of children,
parents, and grandparents, the parent-child relationship in Utah is
currently guarded by special statutory protections, at least in the
context of grandparent visitation cases. These protections recognize

219. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
220. See, e.g., Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 5 n.1, 144
P.3d 1083.
221. Campbell, 896 P.2d at 640.
222. Id. at 639.
223. See Grandparents’ Rights Extended, ch. 175, 1992 Utah Laws 676.
224. Pilot Program Repeal Clean-Up, 2005 Utah Laws 1107 (codified as amended at
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 2005)).
225. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 29–32.
226. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(g).
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the fundamental interest parents have in the care, custody, and
control of their children, and they presume that parents act in the
best interest of their children regarding grandparent visitation
decisions. Nevertheless, upon a showing of sufficient countervailing
factors by clear and convincing evidence, grandparents can rebut the
presumption that the parent’s decision is reasonable and in the best
interest of the child.227 Grandparents who meet this stricter standard
are still able to obtain state assistance to gain visitation in order to
prevent harm to their grandchildren.228
V. TESTING TROXEL’S IMPACT: DO UTAH’S POST-TROXEL
DECISIONS PROPERLY DEFER TO A FIT PARENT’S DECISION WHEN
THE CHILD WOULD NOT BE HARMED ABSENT AN ORDER?
A review of grandparent visitation decisions in Utah appellate
courts after Troxel reveals that the amendments to the Grandparent
Visitation Statute are probably not clear enough to protect parents’
fundamental interests in raising their children or to focus courts’
attention on preventing harm to children. Since Troxel, one Utah
grandparent visitation case has been decided based on the 1998
statute,229 and a second case was recently decided in the Utah
Supreme Court under the 2002 statute.230
In the first case, Pasquin v. Souter, the court found no evidence
that the child would be harmed without a visitation order, so it
deferred to the parent’s visitation decision, an interpretation of the
1998 Grandparent Visitation Statute that is consistent with Troxel.231
The second case, Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), was
an as-applied constitutional challenge to the Utah Grandparent
Visitation Statute.232 The Utah Supreme Court correctly found the
revised 2002 statute constitutional under Troxel but admitted that

227. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2).
228. It is important for courts, legislators, and grandparent visitation advocates to
remember that those grandparents who cannot meet this standard still have resources—albeit
old-fashioned ones—for increasing the likelihood that their visits with their grandchildren will
be encouraged and welcomed: kindness, cooperation, and respect for the parent’s role and
decision-making, combined with being of true assistance to both the parent and the children.
229. Pasquin v. Souter, No. 970910481 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. July 8, 2001) (mem.), aff’d
mem., 2003 UT App 10.
230. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46.
231. See Pasquin, No. 970910481.
232. 2006 UT 46.
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legislative guidance on the application of the statute’s factors would
be helpful to ensure that judges properly balance the competing
demands involved in grandparent visitation cases.233 The court’s asapplied decision in this case concluded that the lower court’s
grandparent visitation order did not infringe upon parental liberty
interests.234 However, the court’s application of the Statute in this
case is evidence that without further legislative guidance, particularly
regarding the Statute’s harm factor, grandparent visitation in Utah is
still more likely to cause greater harm to children than it prevents.
A. Pasquin v. Souter: A Visitation Order Denied
Utah’s first post-Troxel grandparent visitation case upheld a fit
single mother’s decision to completely deny grandparent
visitation.235 Pasquin v. Souter required the court to apply the 1998
statute to a petition by a grandmother who requested visitation with
her deceased son’s child against the mother’s (Ms. Souter’s)
wishes.236 The dispute over visitation was the result of a rocky
relationship between the mother and the grandmother.237 While the
grandmother had previously had a meaningful relationship with her
grandchild, she had only had minimal contact with the child for
three years prior to her son’s death.238 The grandmother filed a
petition for visitation under the Statute so that she could teach her
granddaughter about her father’s life and preserve his memory,
stating she was “best equipped to accomplish this and eager to
start.”239 The mother objected to visitation in part because the
grandmother planned to have the child associate with other children
fathered by her deceased son in other nonmarital relationships.240
The court’s memorandum decision noted that although the
1998 Grandparent Visitation Statute only required a “best interest”
analysis in cases of death or divorce of the grandparent’s child,241
after Troxel, courts must analyze each of the statutory factors when
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 43.
Pasquin, No. 970910481.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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considering visitation petitions by all grandparents.242 Therefore,
despite the 1998 statute’s contrary language and the Campbell
precedent on record, the court interpreted both the statute and
Campbell to constitutionally require all grandparents to rebut the
presumption of parental reasonability by clear and convincing
evidence.243 This standard was implied by the court’s declaration that
“it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a parent’s reasonable
decision to deny a grandparent visitation with a child would be
contrary to the child’s best interests.”244 The trial court reviewed the
facts of the case and ruled that the record “contain[ed] facts
sufficient . . . to conclude that the best interests of [the child were]
best served by deferring to decisions made by her mother concerning
visitation with the [grandmother].”245 The mother refused all
visitation at that time.246 On appeal, the decision was upheld.247
Pasquin demonstrates that a post-Troxel Utah court
interpretation of the Grandparent Visitation Statute followed
Troxel’s requirement for courts to presume that a fit parent’s
decision is in the child’s best interest, even when a single parent
denied all visitation to a fit grandparent. The court’s decision notably
did not include a Campbell analysis; thus, Campbell appears to have
had little to no precedential influence. Instead, the most significant
statutory factor appears to have been the lack of any current,
ongoing relationship between the grandmother and the grandchild
despite there having been a previously existing relationship,
indicating that the child would probably suffer no harm from losing
the relationship by deferring to the mother’s decision.
Unfortunately, Pasquin is a district court memorandum decision
with limited precedential influence on higher state courts.248
Nevertheless, it is a good example of deference to a parent’s
visitation decision under Troxel and suggests that when a visitation

242. See id.
243. Id. at 2–3.
244. Id. at 2.
245. Id. at 3.
246. Id. at 5.
247. Pasquin v. Souter, 2003 UT App 10 (mem.).
248. This is true even in the unusual situation presented by Pasquin, which was decided
in the Third District by the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, now of the Utah Supreme Court,
who concurred in the Thurgood decision that affirmed a grandparent visitation order against a
fit father’s wishes.
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order may create greater harm to the child than it will prevent,
grandparent visitation is appropriately denied.
B. Thurgood: Failure To Properly Defer, or a Sufficient Showing of
Harm that Justifies Overriding a Fit Parent’s Visitation Decision?
In contrast to Pasquin, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a
grandparent visitation award in Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of
S.T.T.), a recent high-conflict case.249 This decision may delineate
what the court considers to be a sufficient showing of harm to justify
overriding a fit parent’s visitation decision. Alternatively, the court
may have failed to properly defer to the parental presumption by
Troxel standards before applying the Grandparent Visitation Statute’s
rebuttal factors. In either case, the decision is troubling and suggests
that the Statute should be amended to require a heightened showing
of harm so that the competing needs and interests of children,
parents, and grandparents are more appropriately balanced.250
1. History of the case
The Utah Supreme Court began its Thurgood opinion with a
truncated and grandparent-centered recital of the facts. This is a
reflection of its focus on the rebuttal factors of the Grandparent
Visitation Statute rather than on any factors relevant to first
upholding the constitutionally-required presumption that the
parent’s decision was in the child’s best interest.251 The decision fails
to either include or analyze facts relevant to whether the father’s
visitation decision was reasonable and should have been granted
deference because it could be presumed to be in his child’s best
interest. Therefore, this Section begins by presenting additional
249. 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083.
250. Unless the statute is amended, Thurgood will likely have significant precedential
effect. It has already garnered significant media attention heralding grandparent rights. See
Geoffrey Fattah, Grandparent-Visit Ruling Is Praised, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Aug. 26,
2006, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,645196283,00.html. This
article contains numerous factual errors, but it garnered enough attention statewide that even
the court’s case file on Thurgood contains a letter from a Utah attorney referencing it and
requesting a copy of the case because of the hope it gave grandparents. See also Pamela Manson
& Jeremiah Stettler, Grandparent Visitation Rights Upheld, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 26, 2006,
available at http://www.sltrib.com/utah/ci_4242203; Utah Court Upholds Grandparent
Visitation Rights, KUTV, Aug. 26, 2006, http://kutv.com/topstories/local_story_238181
300.html.
251. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 1–12.
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background of the Thurgood case as identified in the appellate record
and in a previous court of appeals decision.252
This case began in 2000, when a father, Darryl Thurgood,
disputed visitation rights sought by his daughter’s maternal
grandmother, Darlene Uzelac.253 Mr. Thurgood and his wife
divorced in 1994; after a brief reconciliation, their child was born in
December 1995.254 From 1996 to 1999, the mother and child lived
with the maternal grandparents while the mother worked in the
grandparents’ home-based real estate business.255 Because of this
living situation, the grandparents had daily contact and interaction
with the child.256 They continued to have frequent contact with the
child after she and her mother moved into their own home in
February of 1999.257
In 2000, when the child was four years old, the mother died
unexpectedly from a short illness, leaving instructions with the
maternal grandmother to apply for guardianship of the child in
contravention to Mr. Thurgood’s parental rights.258 For a twomonth period, the grandmother did not notify Mr. Thurgood of the
mother’s death; instead, she moved into the child’s home to care for
her while her petition for custody and guardianship of the child was
being considered by the court.259
Mr. Thurgood learned of his ex-wife’s death in the newspaper.260
At that time, the grandmother refused to relinquish his daughter,
and he was forced to file an action to gain physical possession and an
appointment of guardianship over his child.261 The court awarded
him temporary custody in June 2000 as “the natural father” with
“absolute parental rights.”262 The final order of February 2001 made
Mr. Thurgood’s custody of his daughter permanent, noting that he
252. See generally Thurgood v. Uzelac (In re S.T.T.), 2003 UT App 439, 83 P.3d 398;
Appellate Record, Thurgood, 2006 UT 46 (No. 20040796) (on file with the Utah Supreme
Court, Salt Lake City, Utah) [hereinafter Appellate Record].
253. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 3–12.
254. Id. ¶ 3.
255. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 1046; see also Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 4.
256. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 3.
257. Id. ¶ 4.
258. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 30.
259. Id.; Thurgood v. Uzelac (In re S.T.T.), 2003 UT App 439, ¶¶ 2–3, 83 P.3d 398.
260. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 2.
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing trial court minute entry of September, 2000).
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was a fit parent and that Ms. Uzelac’s petition for custody failed.263
Nonetheless, the court recommended “some future visitation”
between the grandmother and child, subject to the father’s
approval.264 However, no specific visitation order was made. 265
During this adjustment period, as Mr. Thurgood attempted to
reestablish his own parent-child relationship with his daughter, he
permitted three one- to two-hour visits and numerous phone calls
between the maternal grandparents and his daughter over a ninemonth period.266 According to filings in the record, Mr. Thurgood
was unhappy with these interactions.267 He alleged that the
grandmother was attempting to manipulate the child’s affections and
undermine his relationship with his daughter by showering her with
wrapped gifts, which the child opened during the grandmother’s
visit at Mr. Thurgood’s home, and then packing up the toys in the
trunk of her car and telling the child that she could play with them
when she came to live at the grandparents’ home.268 Additionally,
Mr. Thurgood alleged that the grandmother was not acting in his
daughter’s best interest by withholding approximately $4000 of his
daughter’s Social Security survivor’s benefits that the grandmother
obtained after the child was removed from her custody.269
The record also reveals that after Ms. Uzelac’s petition to take
custody of the child was denied, she amended it to seek a visitation
order.270 Her counsel submitted a hearing brief in May 2001 arguing
that Utah’s 2000 Grandparent Visitation Statute was constitutional
under the newly decided Troxel case and that visitation should be
ordered because Mr. Thurgood “has cut his daughter off from
visitation with her grandparents.”271 Mr. Thurgood objected and

263. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 500.
264. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 3 (quoting trial court order of February 7,
2001).
265. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 705.
266. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 6, 144 P.3d 1083;
Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 177–78.
267. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 176–81.
268. Id. at 178–79.
269. Id. at 771 (transcript of Hearings on Motions, Jan. 9, 2003, p. 16).
270. Id. at 703.
271. Id. at 349. Additionally, the brief asked the court to order visitation according to
“the directives of . . . Campbell v. Campbell.” Id. As shown in Part III.A.3 and Part III.C., it is
questionable whether either the 2000 statute or Campbell would have passed constitutional
muster under Troxel.
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filed a constitutional challenge to the 2000 Grandparent Visitation
Statute that was heard in the Third District Court in June 2001.272
In July, the court ruled that the 2000 statute was constitutional
under Troxel, and that despite Mr. Thurgood’s fitness as a parent,
the court could determine grandparent visitation “based solely upon
question of best interests of the minor granddaughter.”273 The court
informed Mr. Thurgood that he had “invited” the court’s
intervention into his visitation decisions by divorcing the child’s
mother, and that the death of the child’s mother had “created a
situation where the court should consider the issue of visitation
between [the grandmother] and the child.”274
At the grandmother’s request, the court ordered a visitation
evaluation by a “duly qualified evaluator,” after which a trial on
visitation issues would occur near the end of 2001.275 While these
issues were pending, no order of visitation was put in place, and Mr.
Thurgood chose not to respond to Ms. Uzelac’s repeated demands
for visitation.276 Unsatisfied by the response to her demands, Ms.
Uzelac filed a motion for a temporary order of visitation in April
2002.277
In June 2002, apparently without a hearing of any kind, the
court ordered temporary grandparent visitation beginning with two
hours of supervised visitation and increasing over a period of time to
one unsupervised weekend visit each month.278 This order coincided
with Mr. Thurgood’s then six-year-old daughter’s summer vacation
from school, and Mr. Thurgood spent a month during that vacation
traveling with her in Australia shortly after this order was made.279
When he returned in August, during a time when he was
unrepresented by counsel,280 Ms. Uzelac had obtained a court order
granting her a schedule of stepped-up visitation culminating in
272. Id. at 498.
273. Id. at 500. This surprising ruling makes one wonder if the court had read the Troxel
case, which clearly forbade courts from ordering visitation solely upon “best interests,” absent
consideration or even a mention of deference to a fit parent’s wishes. See Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000).
274. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 500.
275. Id. at 500–01.
276. Id.
277. Thurgood v. Uzelac (In re S.T.T.), 2003 UT App 439, ¶¶ 1–2, 83 P.3d 398.
278. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 540.
279. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 4.
280. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 549.
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visitation one weekend per month to continue until trial.281 For two
months, Mr. Thurgood did not comply with this order, and five
scheduled weekend visits were missed.282
In October, Ms. Uzelac filed a motion seeking a contempt order
against Mr. Thurgood for “violations” of this visitation order.283 The
court found Mr. Thurgood in contempt, sentenced him to sixty days
in jail, and informed him that the only way to stay the jail sentence
was for him to deliver his daughter to Ms. Uzelac for visitation every
other weekend throughout the pendency of the case.284
In the face of this looming jail sentence and as his child’s only
surviving parent in an ongoing battle with a woman who had
previously sought to take guardianship of his child away from him,
Mr. Thurgood appeared to have little choice but to comply with the
visitation order. He duly delivered his daughter to Ms. Uzelac for
twice-monthly weekend visits from January to December 2003,
while appealing the contempt order to the Utah Court of Appeals.285
Mr. Thurgood argued that the trial court abused its discretion
because the Utah Code provides that the penalty for violations of
visitation orders can consist of a statutory maximum jail sentence of
only thirty days and make-up visitation only in an amount that
remedies the lost visitation.286 The Utah Court of Appeals agreed
with Mr. Thurgood and reversed the contempt order because the
trial court had abused its discretion by sentencing Mr. Thurgood to
sixty days of jail time and by awarding Ms. Uzelac vastly increased
visitation.287 However, the Utah Court of Appeals refused to
consider Mr. Thurgood’s claims about the trial court’s initial errors
in awarding visitation under the Grandparent Visitation Statute.288
In January 2004, following this December 2003 decision by the
court of appeals, Mr. Thurgood and his eight-year-old daughter
moved to Florida.289 Prior to moving, Mr. Thurgood filed with the
281. Id. at 545–47.
282. See id. at 545, 561. The court’s order for every other weekend visitation was dated
August 23, 2002, meaning that by October 21, the date of Ms. Uzelac’s motion, Mr.
Thurgood would have missed five scheduled visitation weekends.
283. Id. at 561.
284. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 5; Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 400.
285. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶ 5; Appellate Record, supra note 252.
286. In re S.T.T., 2003 UT App 439, ¶¶ 13, 14.
287. Id. ¶ 14.
288. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 401–02.
289. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 6, 144 P.3d 1083.
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court an appropriate notification of his intent to move.290 The notice
proposed an offer of grandparent visitation to include three days at
Christmas, four days in the summer, twice-weekly phone calls, and
visits in Florida for two to three days at a time (including overnight
visits) at the father’s approval.291 This offer was apparently rejected,
and there is no indication in any subsequent hearing or decision that
Mr. Thurgood’s offer was ever considered by the courts as evidence
that Mr. Thurgood was willing to offer some amount of reasonable
visitation to the grandparents.
Ms. Uzelac’s visitation evaluator presented her formal findings of
the child’s attachment to her grandparents to the court on January
19, 2004—almost immediately after Mr. Thurgood’s move to
Florida—even though the evaluation had been conducted four
months earlier.292 Additionally, Ms. Uzelac spoke by telephone to
the child in February 2004, after which the record reveals no further
visitation or telephone calls.293
The trial on the issue of grandparent visitation was held in Utah
on July 28, 2004. Mr. Thurgood was represented by two attorneys,
though he did not attend himself.294 At the trial, Ms. Uzelac offered
as conclusive the testimony of her visitation expert.295 The visitation
expert’s report to the court concluded that the petitioning
grandparents were fit and proper persons to have visitation with the
child, that the child was warmly attached to her grandparents, and
that the child particularly enjoyed being in the home with toys and
clothes she remembered having during the time her mother was
alive.296 This expert further testified that the child “[kept] the
memory of her mother alive via her access to the maternal
290. Id.; Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 868.
291. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 869.
292. Appellate Record, supra note 252 (including information from pages 1 and 4 of the
Grandparent-Grandchild Assessment). The evaluator’s visit occurred in the Uzelacs’ home
during one of the child’s 2003 visitation weekends, although the visit was not a “traditional
formal visitation evaluation” typically requested by courts when making visitation
determinations. Id.
293. The grandmother claimed that she called and left messages at least three times
weekly for several months. Handwritten Log by Grandmother, Thurgood, 2006 UT 46 (No.
20040796). The father argued that he complied with all applicable Orders—the one regarding
telephone contact expired on March 1, 2004. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 901.
294. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 1045.
295. Id. at 1049.
296. Appellate Record, supra note 252 (including information from pages 4 and 6 of the
Grandparent-Grandchild Assessment).
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grandparents,” that she “[was] strongly attached” to the Uzelacs,
and that she would “suffer” if deprived of the relationship.297 The
expert therefore opined that “frequent and on-going visitation” with
the maternal grandparents would be in the child’s best interest.298
The court subsequently ordered grandparent visitation to occur
every fifth weekend within one hundred miles of the child’s home in
Florida (unless a holiday weekend intervened, in which case the child
would spend it with her father), ten days during the summer
vacation, and telephone contact for a minimum of thirty minutes
each Wednesday at seven o’clock in the evening—as well as at any
other time the child wished to call her grandparents.299 Mr.
Thurgood appealed the order, claiming that the Utah Grandparent
Visitation Statute was unconstitutional as it was applied to him.300
He claimed that the courts had never deferred to his visitation
decisions regarding “who, when, and where third parties [were]
going to be permitted visitation with his daughter”301 despite “no
prior ruling that [he was] an unfit parent.”302 The court granted a
stay of the visitation order while Mr. Thurgood’s challenge to the
constitutionality of the Statute was pending.303
2. Constitutional ruling on appeal
The Utah Supreme Court correctly concluded that the current
amended version of Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute was
constitutional after Troxel.304 It began its constitutional analysis by
acknowledging that parents have a constitutional right to make
decisions concerning the “care, custody, and control of their
children” and that those decisions are entitled to deference under the
presumption that they are “in the best interests of their children.”305
297. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 1051–52.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1053–54.
300. Id. at 704.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 500.
303. Id. at 1069.
304. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 36, 144 P.3d 1083.
305. Id. ¶ 13. The court discussed the following cases from 1923–2000: Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
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However, the court then emphasized that the state may
legitimately “limit parental autonomy in raising children” when its
parens patriae interests were implicated.306 It contended that a state’s
parens patriae interest was implicated when a child’s parents
divorce,307 when custody of a child is at issue,308 and when a child has
formed relationships with non-parental third parties.309 The court
also cited numerous state grandparent visitation statutes, including
Utah’s, as evidence that grandparent-grandchild relationships are
among those third-party relationships that implicate a state’s parens
patriae power.310
Then, in support of its conclusion that Utah’s current
Grandparent Visitation Statute was constitutional, the court reviewed
the plurality’s holdings in Troxel.311 According to the court, Troxel
(1) rejected a “‘best interest’ standard as the only limiting factor” to

306. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 14. The court supported this assertion by citing to the
following United States Supreme Court cases that upheld state interference with parental
autonomy to protect children from harm: Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)
(terminating parental rights after due process hearing in cases of abuse and neglect); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 1158 (1944) (upholding a state law prohibiting an aunt from allowing
her nine-year-old niece to street tract at a busy intersection); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (requiring child education); and Sturges & Burn Manufacturing Co. v. Beauchamp,
231 U.S. 320 (1913) (prohibiting youth from working in hazardous occupations).
307. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 15 (citing Utah’s divorce statute).
308. Id. The court discussed Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), which notes that
courts grant custody to one parent over another based on the best interests of the child.
309. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 15–16. The court cited Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d
635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), which approves state intervention to foster grandparentgrandchildren relationships when it would be in the children’s best interest, and Gribble v.
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), which recognizes that some “relationships beyond those of
parent-child may be important enough to protect vis-à-vis visitation,” id. at 66, in that case, a
stepparent relationship upon divorce, id. at 65. Using these citations to justify the state’s
parens patriae intervention to promote third-party visitation in a child’s best interest seems
somewhat inapposite because Campbell, as discussed in Part IV.B., was essentially overruled
after Troxel, and Gribble was not truly a third-party visitation case, but a case between the
divorcing parent/stepparent of the child.
310. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶¶ 15–16 & n.2. The court also presented a truncated
review of the history of Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. Unfortunately,
the review did not take into consideration the limited purposes of its original enactment or
address the early experimentation between broad and narrow approaches to the statute that the
legislature settled in favor of a narrow formulation prior to judicial involvement in Campbell in
1995. The court essentially jumped from the 1977 original statute to the 2005 amended
statute without commenting on the intervening debate and concluded that “the statute favors”
grandparents of grandchildren whose parents have died or been divorced. Id. ¶ 17.
311. Id. ¶¶ 19–24.

1716

SCHOFIELD.MRO.COM

1669]

1/23/2007 2:16:44 PM

Interpreting Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute

a grandparent visitation award,312 (2) required “proper deference to
the parental presumption” of a fit parent,313 and (3) noted that
“special weight” was to be afforded to a fit parent’s grandparent
visitation decision.314
The Utah Supreme Court also correctly recognized that
constitutionally acceptable statutes were likely to contain provisions
deferring to the presumption that fit parents’ visitation decisions
were in their children’s best interest.315 Further, where visitation was
limited or denied, the court also recognized that a statute requiring a
finding that the parent was acting unreasonably “would be more
likely to be upheld.”316
The Utah Supreme Court then applied the Troxel holdings to
Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute to determine whether it was
constitutional.317 First, it presumed without comment that the
Statute met Troxel’s first requirement that third-party visitation
statutes not be overly broad.318 The court made this presumption
because Utah’s statute gives standing only to grandparents and notes
that the timing of visitation petitions are limited and governed by the
Statute.319
Next, the court noted that section 30-5-2(2) met the
prerequisite of deference to a parent’s visitation decision by requiring
courts to presume that fit parents’ visitation decisions are in the best
interests of their children.320 The court then engaged in a lengthy
discussion about the various statutory factors by which a fit parent’s
visitation decision may be rebutted.321 The court broke down these
rebuttal factors into three general categories: One that addresses
situations where a child’s interests may differ from the parent’s, one
that addresses harm a child may suffer without a visitation order, and
one that identifies necessary threshold findings. This Comment will
discuss the court’s interpretation of these groupings in comparison

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. ¶¶ 19, 21 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)).
Id. ¶¶ 20, 23.
Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.
Id.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id. ¶¶ 27–37.
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(1) (2005).
Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 27.
Id. ¶¶ 29–35.
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to Troxel. Then, a review of the Thurgood court’s as-applied decision
will discuss how these factors were inappropriately applied, and
therefore indicate a need for better legislative clarification of the
Statute.
a. Differing interests. The first category of factors in Utah’s
Grandparent Visitation Statute to be identified by the Utah Supreme
Court recognized that divisions in the primary family, for whatever
reason, may result in situations where the interests of children may
be different from the interests of parents.322 The court saw a greater
likelihood that situations in which the “‘in-law’ relationship [was]
the only remaining adult connection”323 would create circumstances
where parents’ interests may differ from children’s interests, resulting
in unreasonable parental visitation decisions that are not in the
child’s best interest.324 The court anticipated that such parent
visitation decisions would receive heightened scrutiny to determine
their reasonability.325
Because the Utah Supreme Court predicted that parents in intact
families were less likely to have interests that conflicted with the best
interest of their children, it was careful to point out that visitation
decisions by parents in intact families would likely be upheld.326
b. Harm without a visitation order. The second category
addressed statutory factors indicating that a child may be harmed
unless the court intervenes with a visitation order.327 Interestingly,
this set of factors was characterized by the court quite differently
than it was in Troxel. The first factor emphasized by the Utah

322. Id. ¶ 30.
323. Id.
324. See id. ¶ 30 & n.6.
325. This is because the court presumed that the statutory factors are more likely to apply
in divided families than in intact families. See id. ¶ 30 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-52(2)(c), (e), (f) (2005)). However, although the court’s reasoning on this issue may be
generally valid, it appears to have resulted in prejudging Mr. Thurgood’s visitation decision as
presumptively unreasonable merely because the in-law relationship is the only remaining adult
connection between the child and her grandparents. See id.
326. Id. ¶ 30 n.6. As a result of this declaration, Utah courts are far less likely to be faced
with the kinds of grandparent visitation battles other states are facing—visitation disputes
fought in typically high-conflict situations between grandparents and their own married
children.
327. Id. ¶ 31.
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Supreme Court was the child’s potential loss of a “substantial
relationship,”328 a factor that did not receive majority support from
the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel as constitutionally sufficient to
rebut the parental presumption.329
The second factor in this category was “denied or unreasonably
limited” visitation,330 which would likely show that “the parent is not
acting in the child’s best interests.”331 However, in Troxel, the court
considered the mother’s limited offer of visitation as evidence that
her visitation decision was not per se unreasonable.332 Since Mr.
Thurgood’s previous visitation offer was not considered in the Utah
Supreme Court’s as-applied decision, this suggests that the court
may view denied or limited visitation as per se evidence that a
parent’s visitation decision is unreasonable.333 This may not be
constitutional under Troxel and is an important distinction because it
emphasizes that under this factor, the reasonability of the parent’s
decision—not what may be in the child’s best interest—is what
courts should be examining at this stage.
Finally, this category also includes the statutory factor addressing
harm to the child that may occur as a result of the loss of a
caretaking or otherwise substantial grandparent relationship.334 The
court correctly concluded that constitutional grandparent visitation
statutes after Troxel do not require a “showing of harm to the
child.”335 It must be remembered, however, that Troxel left a harm

328. Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(d)).
329. See supra Part IV.A. Only three out of nine justices agreed that established,
significant non-parent relationships with children should receive constitutional protection.
330. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(b).
331. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 31.
332. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71 (2000). Four out of nine judges in Troxel
suggested that denied or limited grandparent visitation may be considered in the context of
determining the reasonability of the parent’s visitation decision. Id. at 71. The plurality did
not, as implied by the Utah Supreme Court in Thurgood, indicate that denied or limited
visitation was per se unreasonable and, therefore, a signpost that by itself rebuts the parental
presumption. See 2006 UT 46, ¶ 31.
333. This position is as untenable as the opposite extreme rejected by the court, namely,
that a fit parent’s visitation decision can never be rebutted. See Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 24.
Rather, “special weight” must be given to a fit parent’s “decision about whether to cultivate an
intergenerational relationship” in the first place, id. (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70), and
satisfaction of due process requires that grandparents rebut the parental presumption by clear
and convincing evidence, id. ¶ 28.
334. Id. ¶ 31 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(d)).
335. Id. ¶ 24.
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requirement, in addition to numerous factors other than the basic
elements required by due process, to the prerogative of state
legislatures.336 Thus, while not constitutionally required to uphold
the validity of the Utah statute, Utah’s harm factor was intended to
be an important element in the as-applied analysis due to its
inclusion in the legislature’s post-Troxel revised statute.337
Unfortunately, the Statute provides no guidance as to the type of
harm that will justify rebuttal of the parental presumption, and the
court merely stated that the child must be “affirmatively” harmed by
the parent’s visitation decision.338
c. Necessary threshold findings. The court characterized the final
category of statutory factors as “necessary threshold findings”
without which the court cannot order visitation;339 namely, that the
grandparent must be a “fit and proper person” to be awarded
visitation340 and that all other findings notwithstanding, the court
believes that visitation is in the best interest of the child.341
By classifying the Statute’s rebuttal factors in this way, the court
reiterated that the parent’s decision regarding grandparent visitation
should never be rebutted simply because of the fitness of the
grandparents or because visitation would be in the child’s best
interest.342
Using this approach, the court declared that Utah’s current
Grandparent Visitation Statute included the necessary statutory
factors to make it constitutional under Troxel.343 Further, the court
made very little reference to Campbell, although it did note that the
Statute’s expansive purpose of “fostering relationships between
grandparents and their grandchildren” had been “narrowed
significantly” since the version of the statute at issue in Campbell.344

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
1995)).
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Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 29.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 32.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2) (2004).
Id. § 30-5-2(2)(g).
Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶ 26 n.4 (quoting Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 643 (Utah Ct. App.
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However, despite affirming the constitutionality of the
Grandparent Visitation Statute, the Utah Supreme Court declared
that the Statute was flawed.345 The court called upon the legislature
to provide courts with additional statutory guidelines346 because
giving the proper weight to each factor in an individual visitation
decision was difficult and confusing.347 Indeed, an examination of the
court’s application of the Statute to Mr. Thurgood reveals that the
court’s request is not only appropriate but may be necessary to
protect the fundamental interests at stake. In any case, how to
protect those interests within Troxel’s flexible guidelines is a policy
decision for the legislature, not the judiciary. The legislature should
require grandparents to make a heightened showing of harm to the
child before a visitation order is issued so that the competing needs
of parents, grandparents, and children can more appropriately be
balanced.
2. Statutory as-applied ruling on appeal
Unfortunately, the Thurgood court’s as-applied analysis did not
follow its own outlined structure of factors when ruling on Mr.
Thurgood’s constitutional complaint. It also did not start its analysis
at the Statute’s beginning by first giving Mr. Thurgood’s visitation
decision special weight or evaluating the reasonability of his visitation
decision.348 Rather, the court started its analysis by examining
whether the district court had made clear and convincing findings on
each of the “relevant factors” in the rebuttal section of the Statute.349
By doing so, the Utah Supreme Court appeared to treat these
rebuttal factors more like the elements in a statutory “best interest”
analysis, with the focus on determining whether a combination of
factors existed that made a visitation order appropriate, rather than

345. Id. ¶ 36.
346. Id.
347. See id. ¶ 36 n.7.
348. Id. ¶ 39. The Utah Supreme Court simply stated that “the district court gave special
weight to Mr. Thurgood’s decisions” by placing “the burden of proof on the grandparents to
rebut the presumption that Mr. Thurgood’s visitation decision was in the best interests of the
child.” Id. However, there is no indication that the district court ever considered Mr.
Thurgood’s reasons for his denial and/or restriction of visitation to determine if they were
reasonable or examined whether the circumstances justified his belief that he was acting in his
daughter’s best interest.
349. Id.
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on examining whether Mr. Thurgood’s visitation decision was
unreasonable and not in his child’s best interest or whether his
previous offer of visitation was insufficient to protect her from harm
and thus primed for rebuttal. This application is at odds with both
the Statute and with Troxel.
As a result, Mr. Thurgood has been forced to undergo years of
expensive litigation that he might have been spared if his
constitutionally required parental presumption had first been
examined. The time, expense, and disruption to both Mr. Thurgood
and his daughter is exactly what Justice Kennedy warned of in
Troxel, stating that courts may have a constitutional obligation to
protect parents from such litigation when the disruption is severe.350
Starting with section 30-5-2(2)(a)–(g) of the Utah Code, the
court concluded that the district court had made findings that the
grandparents had rebutted the parental presumption because (1) Mr.
Thurgood’s family structure was non-intact, and the Uzelac’s
daughter had died;351 (2) by a rote and sterile recitation of visitation
dates, Mr. Thurgood was found to have “unreasonably” restricted
visitation;352 (3) the child’s contacts with the Uzelacs in previous
years constituted a “substantial relationship,” the loss of which
“would be harmful to the child”353 based on a one-time informal
visitation evaluation conducted in 2003 when the child was seven
years old;354 and (4) using the statutory “best interest” factors
identified in section 30-3-34 of the Utah Code to determine
visitation and custody decisions between competing parents with coequal claims in divorce, grandparent visitation was found to be in the
child’s best interest.355
The Utah Supreme Court’s as-applied decision should instead
have followed its own constitutional analysis for consistency and
accuracy. Had it done so, the court would have begun with section
30-5-2(2), the parental presumption of reasonability. Reviewing Mr.
Thurgood’s decision for reasonability would likely have led the court
to carefully review the record and acknowledge in its statement of
the facts that from the moment of her daughter’s death, Ms. Uzelac
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
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began pursuing a course to undermine Mr. Thurgood as a parent.
Had the court done so, it would not have been difficult to
understand why a father, adjusting to the new role as sole custodian
of his daughter, might not be overly anxious to relinquish her to a
grandparent who actively sought to deny him that right, especially
when, at the time, grandparent visitation was to occur at his
discretion.
The court would also have had to acknowledge other factors
relevant to upholding Mr. Thurgood’s parental presumption of
reasonability. For example, the court should have at least
acknowledged bias in its statement that the last contact of record
between the child and Ms. Uzelac was in February 2004. In fact, Mr.
Thurgood had offered grandparent visitation at the time of his notice
of intent to move.356 Further, after the trial in July 2004, the parties
stipulated that the court’s visitation order be stayed during the
pendency of Mr. Thurgood’s appeal, which was granted by the
court.357 Instead, the decision omits these facts and others just as
relevant to the reasonability of Mr. Thurgood’s visitation restrictions.
The limited facts presented in the opinion about Mr. Thurgood tend
to portray him as an insensitive parent willfully harming his daughter
by callously restricting grandparent visitation.358 Whether counsel for
Mr. Thurgood failed to argue these points or whether the court’s
sympathies lay with the grandmother for whatever reason, relevant
facts relating to Mr. Thurgood’s decisions were never considered in
the court’s opinion.
Giving Mr. Thurgood’s visitation decision “special weight”
should at a minimum have required the court to examine his
visitation decisions to evaluate their purpose, reasoning, and
356. Appellate Record, supra note 252, at 868.
357. Id. at 1062 (Order Granting Motion for Stay).
358. These statements include the following, which are not countered by any background
facts to explain or justify Mr. Thurgood’s decisions or point of view: After Mr. Thurgood was
awarded sole custody of his daughter, “it became apparent that the parties could not work out
a mutually acceptable visitation schedule.” Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 6. “Mr. Thurgood . . .
did not allow any visitation between the child and the Uzelacs for five months. . . . Mr.
Thurgood allowed Ms. Uzelac to spend one hour with the child.” Id. “Despite the courtordered schedule for visitation . . . Mr. Thurgood only allowed Ms. Uzelac to visit the child
twice between July 2002 and January 2003.” Id. This occurred “despite repeated attempts by
the Uzelacs to contact the child.” Id. ¶ 41. The contempt order was intended to remedy “the
number of visits the father had prevented.” Id. ¶ 6. “The last telephonic visitation on record”
after Mr. Thurgood moved to Florida “occurred in February 2004.” Id. “Mr. Thurgood
terminated all phone contact between the Uzelacs and the child.” Id. ¶ 41.
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projected progression. Had the court done so, the record would
clearly have revealed facts that made Mr. Thurgood’s visitation
decisions sympathetic, if not fully justified. For example, Ms. Uzelac
failed to notify Mr. Thurgood of her daughter’s sudden death,
forced Mr. Thurgood to seek court assistance to obtain physical
possession of his daughter, and then fought Mr. Thurgood in court
to obtain custody of his daughter.359 According to Mr. Thurgood,
during the visitations that he permitted, Ms. Uzelac attempted to
undermine his attempts to establish his own parent-child relationship
with his daughter and manipulated his daughter’s affections by
giving, and then withholding, material gifts.360 Mr. Thurgood
reported financial underhandedness that made him doubt that Ms.
Uzelac’s intentions were in the child’s best interest.361 Further, Ms.
Uzelac has hounded Mr. Thurgood for over six years in the legal
system, resulting in legal bills of an undoubtedly enormous amount,
in her aggressive efforts to obtain and enforce court-ordered
visitation.362 The statutory presumption in favor of Mr. Thurgood’s
visitation decision was never evaluated on the basis of these or any
other facts.
Additionally, the court did not consider the harm that Ms.
Uzelac was willing to impose on her granddaughter. The court
expressed no concern that Ms. Uzelac sought and obtained a
contempt order against her granddaughter’s only remaining parent
for missing five visits.363 If Mr. Thurgood had resisted this order and
served his sixty-day jail sentence as a matter of principle, his young
daughter would effectively have lost both of her parents in a short
amount of time. Contempt orders for missing visitation may be more
appropriate in the context of two divorced parents with an equal
claim to the child, but for a grandmother to guarantee visitation by
using the threat of a jail sentence against a child’s only surviving
parent seems absurdly harmful to the child.364

359. See supra Part V.B.1.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46.
364. This may be why these sanctions were repealed in 2005. See Pilot Program Repeal
Clean-Up, ch. 129, 2005 Utah Laws 1215. These forces on a single parent in a grandparent
visitation battle are nearly irresistible, as shown by Mr. Thurgood’s compliance with a visitation
order for the entire year that it took to appeal and receive relief.
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Further, the court did not acknowledge the harm the
grandmother was causing to Mr. Thurgood or the child by
constantly undercutting Mr. Thurgood’s role as a parent.365 Had
these harms been considered, the court might have acknowledged
that it was reasonable under these circumstances for a father to feel
that his child’s best interest was served by temporarily creating a little
distance from her grandmother. Mr. Thurgood did not argue that
his decision to restrict or deny visitation was forever fixed and
unchangeable; he merely argued that, given the history and current
circumstances, his grandparent visitation decision deserved
constitutional protection.366
The harm the court did discuss in its decision was the rebuttal
factor in section 30-5-2(2)(d), addressing the likely harm to be
suffered by the grandchild as a result of the loss or cessation of the
grandparent relationship.367 The court’s reliance on the visitation
expert’s testimony368 about harm the child would suffer without a
visitation order raises several questions about the Statute’s harm
requirement that the legislature and courts should consider.
In particular, what kind of harm to the child justifies a visitation
order? Does “affirmative” harm mean anything more than “a
specialist says so”? For example, if the evidence revealed that a child
had successfully weathered a transition period where a visitation
order to maintain continuity may previously have been justified,
must a parent comply with an ongoing grandparent visitation order
so that the child may “process” previous losses? If so, for how long?
In Thurgood, where the child is now nearly eleven years old and there
is no evidence in the record that she has been unable to keep the
memory of her mother alive without visitation with her maternal
grandparents during the pendency of the case, should the father’s
visitation offer be superseded by the court because at some point in
the past the child and her mother lived in the grandparents’ home?
At what point does a cross-country grandparent visitation order
imposed on a parent in a high conflict situation cause more harm to
the child than it prevents? If it is true, as the court stated in Pasquin,
365. Thurgood, 2006 UT 46.
366. Brief for the Appellant, Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46,
144 P.3d 1083 (No. 003900606).
367. See Thurgood, 2006 UT 46, ¶ 31 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(d)
(2005)).
368. Id. ¶ 10.
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that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a situation in which a parent’s
reasonable decision to deny a grandparent visitation with a child
would be contrary to the child’s best interests,”369 is state intrusion
to order grandparent visitation justified by the showing of harm that
has been made in this case? Do high conflict relationships between
the parents and grandparents over prolonged, expensive litigation
and visitation orders harm children less than the harm the visitation
order is intended to prevent?
Should the court consider not just the harm that may occur
without a visitation order, but also consider how the child has been
harmed by the grandparents’ attempts to secure visitation? In
Thurgood, for example, the court did not appear to consider that the
child may have been harmed by the grandmother’s refusal to inform
the father of the mother’s sudden death or by her attempts to
prevent the child’s access to, and bonding with, her father.
Additionally, the court did not seem to consider that the child may
have been harmed by knowing that her grandmother would seek to
send her father to jail unless she visited with her grandmother. These
questions suggest that the Utah legislature should spell out the
relevant factors for showing harm to a child that justify a visitation
order. By doing so, courts are more likely to balance all of the harms
facing children as a result of grandparent visitation litigation.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REQUIRING A HEIGHTENED HARM
STANDARD IN THE UTAH GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE
There are several excellent reasons for the Utah legislature to
amend the Grandparent Visitation Statute to require all grandparents
to make a heightened showing of harm before authorizing courts to
award grandparent visitation. First, grandparents—in the absence of
special circumstances that have created a quasi-parental status toward
the child—simply do not stand on an equal constitutional footing
with parents; nor do they share the same obligations and
responsibilities toward the child that the state requires of parents. As
Thurgood demonstrated, the Statute’s constitutional protection for
parents—the initial presumption that a parent’s decision is in the best
interest of the child—was easily overcome as the Statute’s harm
factor is currently formulated.
369. Pasquin v. Souter, No. 970910481, at 2 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. July 8, 2001) (mem.),
aff’d mem., 2003 UT App 10.
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Second, when courts order grandparent visitation, a variety of
pragmatic challenges arise that should be considered when setting
the appropriate standard of harm.370 Requiring grandparents to make
a heightened showing that the child would be harmed without a
visitation order justifies state intrusion by providing balance between
the inevitable harms of visitation orders and the harm that an
appropriate visitation order would prevent.371
Third, grandparent visitation litigation places “children [at the]
focal point of anger” between parents and grandparents.372 When
children are asked to voice their visitation preferences, not only is
that stressful, but they invariably end up having to choose a side.
Although children may not understand the reasoning behind their
parent’s decision, they are given veto power over it.373 Requiring
grandparents to meet a heightened harm standard would spare both
parents and children from the harm caused by the state permitting
children to undermine the very parental authority intended to
protect them.
Fourth, children whose parents are divorced face special
challenges in grandparent visitation cases because the child and the
custodial parent may easily become subject to multiple visitation
orders that substantially interfere with the parent-child
relationship.374 Typically, the most important relationships for
children to preserve in a divorce situation are their relationships with
both parents. Requiring grandparents to make a heightened showing
of harm would prevent visitation orders that are not essential for the
child, leaving more time available for more critical parental
relationships. Additionally, a heightened harm standard for
grandparent visitation would prevent misuse of the Statute by
grandparents primarily seeking to secure more visitation for the

370. See Nolan, supra note 4. The author thoughtfully considers numerous practical
challenges of visitation orders and the consequences suffered by both children and parents
when a standard other than harm determines the appropriateness of a grandparent visitation
order. See id. Furthermore, “even if [a grandparent-grandchild bond would be beneficial to the
child if maintained], the impact of a lawsuit to enforce maintenance of the bond over the
parents’ objection can only have a deleterious effect on the child.” Brooks v. Parkerson, 454
S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. 1995).
371. For examples of pragmatic grandparent visitation challenges, see Nolan, supra note
4, at 269.
372. Newman, supra note 4, at 27–28.
373. Id. at 28.
374. Nolan, supra note 4, at 282–83.
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noncustodial parent than authorized by the court in the parent’s
divorce decree.
Finally, grandparents of children in intact families should be
required to make a heightened showing of harm to discourage
controlling grandparents’ improper use of state authority to compel
the behavior of their adult children.375 The policy of the state should
be to encourage grandparents to recognize their children’s
independence and not allow the authority of the state to be used to
“attack . . . the parents’ status as adults,”376 so that grandparents can
reap the rewards of intergenerational contact where they did not
sow. By refusing to intervene in parents’ grandparent visitation
decisions on a lesser showing of harm, the state encourages healthier
development for children, parents, and grandparents alike.377
Adding a heightened harm requirement to Utah’s Grandparent
Visitation Statute raises two immediate issues: What should the
standard of harm be, and at what point in the court’s analysis should
it be considered? The experience of other states may be helpful to
reveal the implications of these choices.
A. How To Characterize a Harm Requirement
Other states that require grandparents to make a showing of
harm to the child before awarding grandparent visitation characterize
this harm element in varying ways. For example, in some states the
loss of an established relationship alone does not constitute harm to
children.378 In others, harm is characterized as a showing that the
child’s “health, safety, or welfare” will be significantly and adversely
affected by the lack of a visitation order.379 Some states require a
grandparent to have been the child’s “primary caregiver and
custodian” for a significant period of time before the relationship
constitutes a compelling state interest that justifies “the court’s

375. Newman, supra note 4, at 31.
376. Id.
377. See Nolan, supra note 4, at 284.
378. See Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (Mass. 2002); In re Parentage of
C.A.M.A., 109 P.3d 405, 412 (Wash. 2005).
379. See Wickham v. Byrne, 769 N.E.2d 1, 6, 8 (Ill. 2002) (explaning that true safety
and welfare concerns do not include such intangibles as preserving the “child’s only connection
to a deceased parent’s family” or arbitrary decisions based on conflict between the parent and
the grandparent); Blixt, 774 N.E.2d at 1060.
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parens patriae authority on behalf of the child.”380 An even more
protective standard of harm would require grandparents to make a
threshold showing of parental unfitness to make a visitation decision
before the state may consider intervening in a grandparent visitation
case.381
When the Utah legislature considers amending the Grandparent
Visitation Statute, the reasoning of the district court judge in
Campbell is worth noting. He suggested that in the absence of a
showing of parental unfitness that unreasonably “exposes the
children to danger,” the State should not infringe “upon a parent’s
right to raise his or her children,” because the public policy interest
is enhanced by deferring to reasonable parental decisions.382
One advantage of setting the Statute’s harm requirement at a
high level that requires an initial showing of parental unfitness to
make a visitation decision is that state courts are already familiar with
parental unfitness standards in the context of custody cases and
abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings. Another advantage of
this standard is that children generally do better when they are
guided, reared, and protected by the decisions of their fit parents
than they do under state supervised orders.383 Issuing grandparent
visitation orders, on the other hand, guarantees that many cases will
return to the courts for ongoing state review and intervention.
It is easy to rationalize that requiring a threshold standard of
parental unfitness is a higher standard than necessary for a fairly
innocuous award of grandparent visitation for a few hours several
times a month. However, many awards of grandparent visitation are
substantially more intrusive than that and result in significant private
and public costs each time the state interferes in a fit parent’s childrearing decisions.384 Requiring grandparents to show that a parent is
unfit to make visitation decisions before authorizing courts to
consider whether a grandparent visitation order is in the child’s best
380. Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 302 (Me. 2000); see also Roth v. Weston, 789
A.2d 431, 443 (Conn. 2002) (explaning that a parent-like relationship is a jurisdictional
threshold that must be met before a court will consider a grandparent visitation petition).
381. See Lamberts v. Lillig, 670 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Iowa 2003); see also Polasek v.
Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 522–23 (Mont. 2006).
382. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
383. See Nolan, supra note 4, at 285–87.
384. See generally DAN L. GOLDBERG, GRANDPARENT-GRANDCHILD ACCESS: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 41 (2003), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/pad/reports/2003
-FCY-15E.pdf.
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interest protects children while still providing recourse for
grandparents in compelling situations. For grandparents unable to
make this showing, visitation with grandchildren is merely delayed,
either until the adults are able to work out their difficulties or until
the children are old enough for the grandparents to approach them
independently.385
Alternatively, the legislature should adopt a less stringent
showing of harm than parental unfitness but that is still protective of
children and parents. Thurgood demonstrated that harm
characterized as the loss of substantial relationships can be proven on
very insubstantial grounds.386 Therefore, this standard of harm is
probably not high enough. An intermediate standard may be to
require grandparents to show that the grandchildren’s health, safety,
and welfare would be harmed more without a visitation order than
they would be if the grandchildren were subject to a visitation order.
Under one of these alternative standards of harm, however,
determining when this factor should come into play becomes
important.
B. Analysis Under an Amended Statute
To protect parents from the burden of being unnecessarily
required to “justify their use of parental authority,”387 any
amendment to the Grandparent Visitation Statute should first
require courts to make threshold findings about the fitness of all
parties. A visitation order should never be made unless the
grandparent is a “fit and proper person to have visitation with the
grandchild.”388 However, unless a grandparent makes a threshold
showing of parental unfitness to make visitation decisions, the state
should not consider intervening to authorize grandparent visitation.

385. The experience of numerous parents and adoptees who have successfully established
meaningful relationships after the child reached the age of majority is at least one indication
that a loving blood connection is not forever denied to grandparents by a court’s refusal to
interfere with parental autonomy on any lesser showing. See generally Jane E. Atkinson,
Grandparents’ Visitation Rights: A Survey of Reciprocal Kinship-Ties Based in Historical
Common Law and Legislative Policies, 6 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 39 (2004).
386. Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, ¶ 42, 144 P.3d 1083.
387. GOLDBERG, supra note 384, at 41 (quoting Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent
Visitation, Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 393, 430 (1986)).
388. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2(2)(a) (Supp. 2005).
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This is the most protective grandparent visitation analysis the
legislature could adopt.
Alternatively, if a less stringent showing of harm is adopted,
whether the grandparents have met the required harm standard
should be considered early in the statutory analysis to prevent
unnecessary or protracted litigation. Accordingly, when a
grandparent can show that the children’s health, safety, and welfare
will be harmed more without a visitation order than they would be if
they were subject to a visitation order, the court should next
examine the visitation preferences of the parent. If the amount and
type of visitation preferred by the parent is reasonably suited to
prevent the harm that would be caused without a visitation order,
the court should defer to the parent’s visitation offer. This deference
increases the likelihood that parents will comply with the visitation
orders and prevents the harm that would result if a child’s parent
became subject to a contempt or jail order for visitation
noncompliance. And, it decreases the protracted litigation that
comes at the expense of the parent and the children.389 As a final
check, the court still should consider whether, in light of all factors,
visitation would be in the child’s best interest.390

389. Penalties for noncompliance with a visitation order are justified when a visitation
order prevents harm to a child and when such a penalty protects the integrity of the court
system. However, because the state’s power to hold parents in contempt for noncompliance
also has the effect of harming the child, state courts should exercise restraint in issuing intrusive
visitation orders with which parents are not likely to comply. This is a further justification for
requiring a harm standard rather than a best interest standard. See Nolan, supra note 4, at 285–
86.
390. Id. Grandparents’ demands for court-ordered visitation against the parent’s wishes
brings to mind Aesop’s fable of the contest between the wind and the sun; the illustration is an
apt one. In that contest, the wind and the sun debated over who could remove a cloak more
quickly from the back of a passing traveler. The wind boasted that it was so powerful and
forceful that it could remove the traveler’s cloak whether the traveler liked it or not. However,
upon exerting all of its power, the wind was unable to do so because the cold, biting wind
compelled the traveler to cling desperately to his cloak. The sun, on the other hand, when
given its turn, shone so brightly and warmly upon the traveler that in no time at all, the
traveler released his tight grasp, unbuttoned his cloak, and finally, on his own initiative,
removed it completely. Without a compelling case to protect a child from harm, when
grandparents force parents to subject their parenting decisions to court review, expend large
sums of money or acquire debt to defend their decisions, and perhaps eventually submit to a
court-ordered schedule of visitation, they are like the fabled wind. The approach of these
grandparents causes parents to defend their decisions and cling more tightly to their children
than ever before. Similarly, statutory interpretations that require a lesser showing than harm to
the child before overriding the parent’s visitation decisions simply turn state power into wind
as well. On the other hand, statutes and case-by-case interpretations that uphold a fit parent’s
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C. Learning from the Experience of Other States
Reviewing a sampling of grandparent visitation cases issued by
the highest state courts that have considered their grandparent
visitation statutes post-Troxel is helpful to reveal the implications of
the choices faced by the Utah legislature. For example, in some
states, Troxel’s constitutionally mandated parental presumption may
not be rebutted unless the child would be substantially harmed
without a visitation order.391 Other states do not require a showing
of harm but do give the parental presumption “special weight” or
allow it to be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.392
Balancing tests393 or other standards that protect parents to varying
degrees394 are used by other states, while some have not yet taken
action to ensure the constitutionality of their statutes after Troxel.395
States in the Rocky Mountain area reflect this split among
perspectives with Arizona,396 Colorado,397 Nevada,398 and New

visitation decision when the child is not in danger of substantial harm without the visitation
order are like the fabled sun. Likewise, grandparents who accept the important role of the
child’s parent, respect the parent’s visitation decision despite their desire for greater contact
with the child, and continue to show warmth to both the parent and the child will likely find,
as did the sun, that patience and gentle persuasion will help them achieve their goal.
391. See, e.g., Richburg v. Richburg, 895 So. 2d 311 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004); Roth v.
Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002); Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2004); Brooks v.
Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995); Lamberts v. Lillig, 670 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 2003);
Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000); Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass.
2002); Appel v. Appel, 109 P.3d 405 (Wash. 2005).
392. See, e.g., Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078 (Alaska 2004); McGovern v.
McGovern, 33 P.3d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Simmons v. Vassar-Hawk, 807 A.2d 579 (Del.
2002); In re Visitation of C.H., 792 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Paillet, 16
P.3d 962 (Kan. 2001); DeRose v. DeRose, 666 N.W.2d 636 (Mich. 2003); Nelson v. Nelson,
674 N.W.2d 473 (Neb. 2004); Deem v. Lobato, 96 P.3d 1186 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004);
Harrington v. Daum, 18 P.3d 456 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
393. See, e.g., Babin v. Babin, 854 So. 2d 403 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Herrick v. Wain, 838
A.2d 1263 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003); Barker v. Barker, 98 S.W.3d 532 (Mo. 2003).
394. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Harris, 96 P.3d 141 (Cal. 2004); Camerlingo v.
Camerlingo, 961 P.2d 1162 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); In re Marriage of Meyer, No. C7-00-145,
2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 882 (Aug. 22, 2000); Townes v. Manyfield, 883 So. 2d 93 (Miss.
2004).
395. See Jessica Marie Beyer, Comment, Idaho’s Approach to Grandparent Visitation:
Time for a Revision, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 155 (2003).
396. McGovern v. McGovern, 33 P.3d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
397. In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006).
398. Steward v. Steward, 890 P.2d 777 (Nev. 1995). Steward set Nevada’s standard preTroxel in a manner that did not require major statutory changes after Troxel.
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Mexico399 requiring the parental presumption to be given special
weight or to be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly,
Montana requires courts to first inquire into a parent’s fitness and
then give deference to a fit parent’s decision.400 Wyoming requires a
balancing test,401 and Idaho has not yet amended its statute since
Troxel.402
It is at times poignant to read court decisions where grandparent
visitation is denied because of a state’s higher harm standard.403 In
most cases, it is impossible to know whether the parents and the
grandparents eventually settled their differences and resumed more
ordinary interaction between the grandparents and the
grandchildren. On the other hand, a review of state court cases
where visitation has been granted under a best interest or other
standard404 frequently reveals distressing intrusions by a powerful and
nearly irresistible state judiciary. Many ordinary parents, particularly
those struggling with the financial challenges of raising children,
simply cannot defend against these intrusions. It is questionable
whether these visitation orders are ultimately benefiting children or
harming them.
In the final analysis, the Utah Grandparent Visitation Statute
should be amended to better balance the competing needs and
interests of children, parents, and grandparents by defining and
requiring a heightened showing of harm. Such an amendment will
better ensure that, when appropriate, a grandparent visitation order
will not cause greater harm to children than the visitation will
prevent.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although Utah’s Grandparent Visitation Statute may be an
improvement over the lack of a common law grandparent visitation
right in today’s changed society, the Statute must be limited. The
399. Deem v. Lobato, 96 P.3d 1186 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
400. Polasek v. Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 522–23 (Mont. 2006).
401. The Wyoming Supreme Court has not ruled on the statute’s constitutionality since
Troxel but applies a best interest and reasonability analysis with a requirement to show that an
order would not impair parental rights. See, e.g., Hede v. Gilstrap, 107 P.3d 158 (Wyo. 2005).
402. See Leavitt v. Leavitt, 132 P.3d 421 (Idaho 2006) (declining to reach constitutional
issue since review of magistrate’s decision was in parent’s favor); see also Beyer, supra note 395.
403. See generally supra note 391.
404. See generally supra notes 392–94.
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early history of the Statute indicates that its purpose was to prevent
harm to children, not to advance the privileges of adults.
Courts, including the highest court in the land, have had
difficulty balancing the needs and rights of parents and children with
the mandates of state grandparent visitation statutes. The Utah
legislature has now had experience revising its statute multiple times
under both state and federal constitutional directives. Utah courts
have also had experience trying to apply these various iterations of
the Statute. This Comment has presented exhaustive detail about the
history of these efforts. And now, the Utah Supreme Court has
invited the legislature to make one more revision to the Statute on
the basis of this experience.
This Comment has laid a foundation to suggest that the
legislature should revise the Grandparent Visitation Statute to
require a heightened showing of harm. Grandparents should not be
able to rebut the parental presumption without showing that a
parent is unfit and that his or her visitation decision will substantially
harm the children. Alternatively, grandparents could be required to
show that the children’s health, safety, and welfare will be harmed
more without a visitation order than they would be if they were
subject to a visitation order. Only upon this showing should the
court then examine whether the amount and type of visitation
preferred by the parent is reasonably suited to prevent the harm that
would be caused without a visitation order. If it is, the court should
defer to the parent’s visitation decision. Rebutting the parental
presumption on any lesser showing of harm unnecessarily intrudes
on the lives of children and parents and makes court-ordered
visitation like a wolf in disguise that ultimately harms the very
children it is intended to protect.
Tracy C. Schofield
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